Free will
in [Lisp]
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From: Bob Felts on 21 May 2010 10:12 Nick Keighley <nick_keighley_nospam(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > On 20 May, 14:09, w...(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > > RG <rNOSPA...(a)flownet.com> wrote: > > <snip> > > > > Quantum randomness does not rule out the possibility of classical > > > determinism under the right circumstances. Computers are a pretty good > > > example of this. > > > > So would an AI with a decision making module based on quantum randomness > > with an extremely large state space be considered determined or free? > > false dichotomy. Is a radium atom "free".? Maybe. See Conway's "Free Will Theorem". > You need to explain what "free" means and I think for any conventional > meaning of "free" you're just wrong. Maybe. If we go by the definition "not under the control or power of another", then we have to look at the question under different worldviews. Under a strict materialist worldview, and under this definition, I would be free. Under some theistic worldviews, God does not interfere (e.g. Arminianism), while in others He does (Calvinism). I don't know whether or not Pascal is a theist, but he used the example of a software construct to show that free will falls under this first definition. Suppose we go by the definition of "not physically restrained", in which we take this to mean "not subject to the laws of physics". Raffael argues that this means that free will does not exist (unless the will is supra-physical). Under a strict materialist view, others argue that there's still room for freedom. It is in this latter context that I'm curious to know what others think. Hence my question about an AI with a large state space that uses a quantum random generator to drive its behavior. Is it determined, or free? An argument can be made for both. Ron, I think, says that since this AI has the illusion of freedom, that it is indeed free ("My definition is that free will *is* the perception/illusion of free will.") But Ron also wrote, "Specifically, free will refers (Wikipedia notwithstanding) to a certain kind of information asymmetry: *I* can know why (or that) I choose to do X, but you can't unless I tell you." Now, if Ron were a theist (which he isn't), this definition of information asymmetry would fall apart in a theistic worldview (unless that god wasn't omniscient). Since such a god would know what a person would choose to do. But foreknowledge isn't predestination. So I'm not sure that the idea of information asymmetry is really a good basis for a definition. Note: if I misstated anyone's position, the fault is entirely mine.
From: RG on 21 May 2010 11:05 In article <ht62d3$p98$1(a)news.eternal-september.org>, Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > On 2010-05-20 20:52:51 -0400, RG said: > > > In article <ht4704$s96$2(a)news.eternal-september.org>, > > Raffael Cavallaro > > <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > > > >> Again, what matters is evidence, not speculation. Evidence indicates > >> free will is an illusion; evidence indicates that fostering retribution > >> makes people more violent, not more calm. > > > > If evidence shows that fostering retribution makes people more violent > > then why bring free will into it at all? You can argue against > > retribution on the purely empirical grounds that reducing retribution > > will reduce violence. No need to get metaphysical. (Your argument will > > fail on other grounds, but we're already pretty far afield here.) > > > > rg > > You made a similar argument about our susceptibility to priming. The > reason we need to bring free will into the discussion is that both of > these conclusions directly contradict our naive subjective experience > of the world. People are quite reluctant to agree to policies that > contradict their naive subjective experience of the world - we want > retribution, for example, because it is consistent with how we naivley, > subjectively feel the world. No, people want retribution because they think it will make them feel good. > This is why your refutation of Dawkins misses the mark Huh? What refutation of Dawkins? I have never "refuted" Dawkins, and certainly not in this conversation. > you and others are one, as the limbs of your body are one > in you. This understanding leads to compassion because when you see > others as one with yourself, you are no more moved to retribution when > wronged than you are moved to shoot your own foot for tripping you. When I was a kid I came up with this theory that because the boundaries between what I called "myself" and "the rest of the world" were kind of fuzzy (if I eat a sandwich, at what point does it stop being a sandwich and start being part of me?) that I was really "one with the universe." But as I got older I realized that this is absolutely 100% wrong. Living things work extraordinarily hard to create boundaries around themselves because doing so is necessary for survival. The creation of a membrane was almost certainly one of the first steps in the creation of life, and now boundaries are to be found at all levels of the life fractal, from the cell wall to the city wall. There is nothing more natural than setting yourself apart, separating yourself from the other. If you want to usher in a pacifist utopia you'd do better to argue that we are all One in Christ than one in zombiehood. You'd get more traction without sacrificing any of your basis in fact. rg
From: Don Geddis on 21 May 2010 16:33 RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote on Thu, 20 May 2010: > Ah, OK. I would say that a very convincing illusion of free choice is > compatible with determinism, and that for all practical purposes this > illusion can be treated as if it were the real thing. It's a minor > quibble. I guess I'm worried that "it's really all an illusion" has the wrong connotations. For example, all the naive conclusions people jump to about the breakdown of laws and morality. The truth is that you can make any decision that you wish to make. Your decisions really are a consequence of your desires, just as you imagine. It is not the case that "something else" makes your decisions, and that you afterwards rationalize that you were "really" the one choosing, but scientists know that in reality "you" had no control at all. That's what people generally assume when you say "free will is an illusion", and that conclusion is false. (It's also the apparent consequence of the neurobiology experiments that started this thread, but people are extrapolating too far from those experiments.) The only minor change to millennia of dualism (besides the lack of a soul), is that, while you can make any decision that you wish to make, your "wishes" themselves are based in ordinary physics, and you can't necessarily "decide" to want something different, than you do in fact want. I'm not comfortable calling that state of affairs, "a very convincing illusion of free choice". I think that opens the door to mistaken conclusions. -- Don _______________________________________________________________________________ Don Geddis http://don.geddis.org/ don(a)geddis.org Reader: "If you find so much that is unworthy of reverence in the United States, then why do you live here?" H.L. Mencken: "Why do men go to zoos?"
From: RG on 21 May 2010 20:23 In article <87zkztc7vn.fsf(a)mail.geddis.org>, Don Geddis <don(a)geddis.org> wrote: > RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote on Thu, 20 May 2010: > > Ah, OK. I would say that a very convincing illusion of free choice is > > compatible with determinism, and that for all practical purposes this > > illusion can be treated as if it were the real thing. It's a minor > > quibble. > > I guess I'm worried that "it's really all an illusion" has the wrong > connotations. Yeah, but that's a marketing issue. This is a techincal NG. :-) > The truth is that you can make any decision that you wish to make. Your > decisions really are a consequence of your desires, just as you imagine. Only insofar as "you", "your desires" and "your decisions" are real. Since Ralph is leaning so heavily on science, and science includes QM, that hedge is necessary. > It is not the case that "something else" makes your decisions, and that > you afterwards rationalize that you were "really" the one choosing, but > scientists know that in reality "you" had no control at all. Yes, that's certainly true. > The only minor change to millennia of dualism (besides the lack of a > soul), is that, while you can make any decision that you wish to make, > your "wishes" themselves are based in ordinary physics, and you can't > necessarily "decide" to want something different, than you do in fact > want. Yes, that's a very good point. You can't choose to believe something you don't believe in either. So free will has limits. > I'm not comfortable calling that state of affairs, "a very convincing > illusion of free choice". I think that opens the door to mistaken > conclusions. Yeah, but we're working on that :-) rg
From: Bob Felts on 21 May 2010 21:35
Don Geddis <don(a)geddis.org> wrote: > wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote on Fri, 21 May 2010: > > Hence my question about an AI with a large state space that uses a > > quantum random generator to drive its behavior. Is it determined, or > > free? An argument can be made for both. > > Or, if you realize that free will is not incompatible with determinism, Absent quantum randomness, and assuming a strict naturalistic worldview, I'd like to see a compelling argument how this could be so. Such an argument cannot depend on one's knowledge of good and evil, either; i.e. "man must be free in order to be responsible" is one such fallacious argument. > you can realize that these aren't opposite ends of a spectrum, and the > random generator really has nothing at all to do with the question of > whether the AI has free will or not. It either does have free will, or > it doesn't, but it doesn't matter whether it has a quantum random > generator inside of it, for answering the question. > If the will doesn't incorporate randomness, then in what sense is it free? Is the function (defun hello () (print "Hello, World!")) free? |