Free will
in [Lisp]
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From: Bob Felts on 24 May 2010 16:26 Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: [...] > > I think we're going around in circles at this point. I'll look at > Deutsch, though I'm deeply suspicious of many worlds on Occam's Razor > grounds, though you say that particular formulation is not necessary, > so... > I think everyone ought to be just as deeply suspicious of Occam's Razor: http://apperceptual.wordpress.com/2008/06/14/ockhams-razor-is-dull/
From: Bob Felts on 24 May 2010 16:33 RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote: > Science is the process of formulating explanatory models of phenomena. > That's a computational process, and it can be accounted for by purely > physical means. Read Deutsch's book. So do you disagree with Russell (and Plato) that: "The problem with which we are now concerned is a very old one, since it was brought into philosophy by Plato. Plato's 'theory of ideas' is an attempt to solve this very problem, and in my opinion it is one of the most successful attempts hitherto made. The theory to be advocated in what follows is largely Plato's, with merely such modifications as time has shown to be necessary. The way the problem arose for Plato was more or less as follows. Let us consider, say, such a notion as justice. If we ask ourselves what justice is, it is natural to proceed by considering this, that, and the other just act, with a view to discovering what they have in common. They must all, in some sense, partake of a common nature, which will be found in whatever is just and in nothing else. This common nature, in virtue of which they are all just, will be justice itself, the pure essence the admixture of which with facts of ordinary life produces the multiplicity of just acts. Similarly with any other word which may be applicable to common facts, such as 'whiteness' for example. The word will be applicable to a number of particular things because they all participate in a common nature or essence. This pure essence is what Plato calls an 'idea' or 'form'. (It must not be supposed that 'ideas', in his sense, exist in minds, though they may be apprehended by minds.) The 'idea' justice is not identical with anything that is just: it is something other than particular things, which particular things partake of. Not being particular, it cannot itself exist in the world of sense. Moreover it is not fleeting or changeable like the things of sense: it is eternally itself, immutable and indestructible. Thus Plato is led to a supra-sensible world, more real than the common world of sense, the unchangeable world of ideas, which alone gives to the world of sense whatever pale reflection of reality may belong to it. The truly real world, for Plato, is the world of ideas; for whatever we may attempt to say about things in the world of sense, we can only succeed in saying that they participate in such and such ideas, which, therefore, constitute all their character. Hence it is easy to pass on into a mysticism. We may hope, in a mystic illumination, to see the ideas as we see objects of sense; and we may imagine that the ideas exist in heaven. These mystical developments are very natural, but the basis of the theory is in logic, and it is as based in logic that we have to consider it. ... Having now seen that there must be such entities as universals, the next point to be proved is that their being is not merely mental. By this is meant that whatever being belongs to them is independent of their being thought of or in any way apprehended by minds. ..." http://www.ditext.com/russell/rus9.html
From: RG on 24 May 2010 19:16 In article <1jj08e6.b7exdn1b2z9a8N%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote: > > > Science is the process of formulating explanatory models of phenomena. > > That's a computational process, and it can be accounted for by purely > > physical means. Read Deutsch's book. > > So do you disagree with Russell (and Plato) that: > > "The problem with which we are now concerned is a very old one, since it > was brought into philosophy by Plato. Plato's 'theory of ideas' is an > attempt to solve this very problem, and in my opinion it is one of the > most successful attempts hitherto made. The theory to be advocated in > what follows is largely Plato's, with merely such modifications as time > has shown to be necessary. > > The way the problem arose for Plato was more or less as follows. Let us > consider, say, such a notion as justice. If we ask ourselves what > justice is, it is natural to proceed by considering this, that, and the > other just act, with a view to discovering what they have in common. > They must all, in some sense, partake of a common nature, which will be > found in whatever is just and in nothing else. This common nature, in > virtue of which they are all just, will be justice itself, the pure > essence the admixture of which with facts of ordinary life produces the > multiplicity of just acts. Similarly with any other word which may be > applicable to common facts, such as 'whiteness' for example. The word > will be applicable to a number of particular things because they all > participate in a common nature or essence. This pure essence is what > Plato calls an 'idea' or 'form'. (It must not be supposed that 'ideas', > in his sense, exist in minds, though they may be apprehended by minds.) > The 'idea' justice is not identical with anything that is just: it is > something other than particular things, which particular things partake > of. Not being particular, it cannot itself exist in the world of sense. > Moreover it is not fleeting or changeable like the things of sense: it > is eternally itself, immutable and indestructible. > > Thus Plato is led to a supra-sensible world, more real than the common > world of sense, the unchangeable world of ideas, which alone gives to > the world of sense whatever pale reflection of reality may belong to it. > The truly real world, for Plato, is the world of ideas; for whatever we > may attempt to say about things in the world of sense, we can only > succeed in saying that they participate in such and such ideas, which, > therefore, constitute all their character. Hence it is easy to pass on > into a mysticism. We may hope, in a mystic illumination, to see the > ideas as we see objects of sense; and we may imagine that the ideas > exist in heaven. These mystical developments are very natural, but the > basis of the theory is in logic, and it is as based in logic that we > have to consider it. ... > > Having now seen that there must be such entities as universals, the next > point to be proved is that their being is not merely mental. By this is > meant that whatever being belongs to them is independent of their being > thought of or in any way apprehended by minds. ..." > > http://www.ditext.com/russell/rus9.html http://www.paulgraham.com/philosophy.html The idea that you can start talking about a notion as fuzzy and ill defined as "justice" and expect to get anywhere is to my mind absurd on its face. You may as well talk about whether modern art is art. rg
From: Bob Felts on 24 May 2010 23:13 RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote: > In article <1jj08e6.b7exdn1b2z9a8N%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, > wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > > > RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote: > > [...] > > http://www.paulgraham.com/philosophy.html > > The idea that you can start talking about a notion as fuzzy and ill > defined as "justice" and expect to get anywhere is to my mind absurd on > its face. You may as well talk about whether modern art is art. > "Utility" is just as fuzzy as "justice" (and for the same reason). Did Graham hang himself by his own petard? In any case, Russell uses other notions which aren't ill-defined to make the same point, namely, "Having now seen that there must be such entities as universals, the next point to be proved is that their being is not merely mental. By this is meant that whatever being belongs to them is independent of their being thought of or in any way apprehended by minds. ... Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something."
From: Don Geddis on 24 May 2010 23:23
Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote on Mon, 24 May 2010: > On 2010-05-23 23:47:17 -0400, Don Geddis said: >> I really don't think your strawman is as mainstream as you believe. > Well, we haven't even started counting Islam, Hinduism, and other religions > that believe in a non-physical, immortal soul. I think you wildly > underestimate the proportion of humanity that believes they themselves are, > in essence, non-physical. That may all be true, but we're discussing free will here, not souls. It doesn't matter what they think of souls (or themselves), because that isn't the subject under discussion. > They attribute their free will to this non-physical soul/atman or > whatever their tradition calls it, not physics, deterministic or > otherwise. They may well attribute free will to souls. So what? We can talk about their concept of free will, and how they are mistaken to believe that it requires a soul. That has been my main point. That the thing people mean when they use the phrase "free will" is an interesting thing, and in fact it does not require the soul that most people believe it requires. You keep replying with your non sequitur, noting that most people think a soul is required for free will. Could be. Doesn't matter. We can still figure out what most people MEAN by "free will", and we (although perhaps not them) can figure out that a soul is not required for it, despite the intuitions of most people that it does. You seem unable to discuss free will, without discussing souls at the same time. I don't know why you have such trouble separating the two. It leads you to make a false assumption, that if you use science to disprove a soul, you have necessarily also disproven free will. That just doesn't follow at all, despite your repeated claims that it does. -- Don _______________________________________________________________________________ Don Geddis http://don.geddis.org/ don(a)geddis.org Sometimes you get in on the ground floor just as the elevator stops working. -- "Real Life Adventures", 10/5/2006 |