Free will
in [Lisp]
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From: RG on 25 May 2010 10:18 In article <1jj1jco.306fmafc614gN%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > Don Geddis <don(a)geddis.org> wrote: > > [...] > > > > That has been my main point. That the thing people mean when they use > > the phrase "free will" is an interesting thing, and in fact it does not > > require the soul that most people believe it requires. > > > > True. What is also interesting is that nobody can seem to agree on what > "free will" means. That's because free will is a concept that is inextricably bound to subjective experience, which is a slippery concept. > Ron, I think, defines free will in terms of information assymetry > between two agents. I don't *define* it that way. My definition of free will is that it is the subjective perception (or illusion if you choose a quantum point of view) that we have free will. Information asymmetry is a consequence of this definition because only I have access to my own subjective experience. > Now, if I understand both you and Ron correctly, it seems odd to define > freedom in terms of knowledge; especially since theologians have shown > that foreknowledge is not predestination; i.e. knowledge is not control. "Theologians have shown"? ROTFLMAO! > I can understand why theists would want to grapple with the issue of the > freedom of the will. What I don't understand is why non-theists even > care. Shouldn't it be a non-issue? It is a non-issue. But arguing about it is so much fun -- in no small measure *because* it's a non-issue. I think it's the geek equivalent of talking about sports. rg
From: Bob Felts on 25 May 2010 11:21 RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote: > In article <1jj1ld7.n4r6g11yujxd6N%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, > wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > > > > > "Utility" is just as fuzzy as "justice" (and for the same reason). Did > > > > Graham hang himself by his own petard? > > > > > > No. He is not proposing that utility be an *object* of philosophical > > > study, but a quality metric for the *results* of philosophical study. > > > > I understand that. The point I was making is that "utility", like > > "justice" is a fuzzy quality metric. People who are utilitarians > > typically don't want to face that (and I don't know if you are a > > utilitarian or not), but it's provably so. His proposal is just as > > flawed as the philosophy he dismisses. > > But utility has an objective measure: is someone willing to pay for it. > Justice likewise has an objective measure -- the scales balance. As for willingness to pay, that's still fuzzy. It's only an appearance of objectivity. People pay for things they don't value and sometimes they don't pay for things they do value. Too, you have to deal with the N-payer problem. Does utility strictly depend on who has the most money?
From: Bob Felts on 25 May 2010 11:33 RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote: > In article <1jj1jco.306fmafc614gN%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, > wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > > > Don Geddis <don(a)geddis.org> wrote: > > > > [...] > > > > > > That has been my main point. That the thing people mean when they use > > > the phrase "free will" is an interesting thing, and in fact it does not > > > require the soul that most people believe it requires. > > > > > > > True. What is also interesting is that nobody can seem to agree on what > > "free will" means. > > That's because free will is a concept that is inextricably bound to > subjective experience, which is a slippery concept. Is it? Only under certain prior assumptions, I suspect. Freedom is typically defined as a relationship between two or more objects; relationships which have objective definitions. > > > Ron, I think, defines free will in terms of information assymetry > > between two agents. > > I don't *define* it that way. My definition of free will is that it is > the subjective perception (or illusion if you choose a quantum point of > view) that we have free will. Information asymmetry is a consequence of > this definition because only I have access to my own subjective > experience. But if our mental machinery is driven by (quantum) randomness, wouldn't that make it non-deterministic, and therefore free? Oh, wait. You don't subscribe to quantum randomness, do you? I need to go back and re-read your paper on entanglement. But I'm also a bit out of my league, at this point. As yet another rabbit trail, what do you think about Joy Christians paper, "Disproof of Bell's Theorem by Clifford Algebra Valued Local Variables"? > > > Now, if I understand both you and Ron correctly, it seems odd to define > > freedom in terms of knowledge; especially since theologians have shown > > that foreknowledge is not predestination; i.e. knowledge is not control. > > "Theologians have shown"? ROTFLMAO! > Just because they don't agree with your worldview doesn't mean that they are wrong on everything. Knowledge is not control. > > I can understand why theists would want to grapple with the issue of the > > freedom of the will. What I don't understand is why non-theists even > > care. Shouldn't it be a non-issue? > > It is a non-issue. But arguing about it is so much fun -- in no small > measure *because* it's a non-issue. I think it's the geek equivalent of > talking about sports. > I don't have to tell you that ideas have consequences. Whether or not the will is free has direct bearing on what one thinks "good" is. This question may seem to come from left field, but there's method to my madness: does might make right?
From: RG on 25 May 2010 11:58 In article <1jj1oi5.1i2fnjnrmuaeN%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote: > > > In article <1jj1ld7.n4r6g11yujxd6N%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, > > wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > > > > > > > "Utility" is just as fuzzy as "justice" (and for the same reason). > > > > > Did > > > > > Graham hang himself by his own petard? > > > > > > > > No. He is not proposing that utility be an *object* of philosophical > > > > study, but a quality metric for the *results* of philosophical study. > > > > > > I understand that. The point I was making is that "utility", like > > > "justice" is a fuzzy quality metric. People who are utilitarians > > > typically don't want to face that (and I don't know if you are a > > > utilitarian or not), but it's provably so. His proposal is just as > > > flawed as the philosophy he dismisses. > > > > But utility has an objective measure: is someone willing to pay for it. > > > > Justice likewise has an objective measure -- the scales balance. Huh? How does that work exactly? Where can I buy myself a set of these scales? Does Amazon carry them? Do they come with an instruction manual? > As for willingness to pay, that's still fuzzy. It's only an appearance > of objectivity. People pay for things they don't value and sometimes > they don't pay for things they do value. Too, you have to deal with the > N-payer problem. Does utility strictly depend on who has the most > money? Don't confuse being objective with being error-free. They are not the same thing. rg
From: Bob Felts on 25 May 2010 12:37
RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote: > In article <1jj1oi5.1i2fnjnrmuaeN%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, > wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > > > RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote: > > > > > In article <1jj1ld7.n4r6g11yujxd6N%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, > > > wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > > > > > > > > > "Utility" is just as fuzzy as "justice" (and for the same > > > > > > reason). Did Graham hang himself by his own petard? > > > > > > > > > > No. He is not proposing that utility be an *object* of > > > > > philosophical study, but a quality metric for the *results* of > > > > > philosophical study. > > > > > > > > I understand that. The point I was making is that "utility", like > > > > "justice" is a fuzzy quality metric. People who are utilitarians > > > > typically don't want to face that (and I don't know if you are a > > > > utilitarian or not), but it's provably so. His proposal is just as > > > > flawed as the philosophy he dismisses. > > > > > > But utility has an objective measure: is someone willing to pay for it. > > > > > > > Justice likewise has an objective measure -- the scales balance. > > Huh? How does that work exactly? Where can I buy myself a set of these > scales? Does Amazon carry them? Do they come with an instruction > manual? > You steal $20 from me, you owe me $20 plus compensation for my time in recovering my losses (based on what my employer pays me). You take my life, yours is forfeit. > > As for willingness to pay, that's still fuzzy. It's only an appearance > > of objectivity. People pay for things they don't value and sometimes > > they don't pay for things they do value. Too, you have to deal with the > > N-payer problem. Does utility strictly depend on who has the most > > money? > > Don't confuse being objective with being error-free. They are not the > same thing. I'm not. But if something is supposed to be useful, one has to know how to use it. Does utility strictly depend on who has the most money? That's what your theory means, unless is "utility plus something else", in which case we need to know what the "something else" is. |