Free will
in [Lisp]
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From: Bob Felts on 17 May 2010 19:27 RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote: > In article <hss9ib$d7n$1(a)news.eternal-september.org>, > Raffael Cavallaro > <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > [...] > > > It is, as Bob Felts points out, also the definition of free will that > > underlies most legal systems. > > If Bob Felts pointed that out then he's simply wrong. > At that point in the discussion, I was using "free will" as an undefined term, and simply pointed out some implications of the "no free will" position. Just want to make sure that if people disagree with me, that they do so based on what I've actually said.
From: RG on 17 May 2010 20:01 In article <hssiks$adv$1(a)news.eternal-september.org>, Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > On 2010-05-17 19:01:10 -0400, RG said: > > > I doubt that very much. In fact, a belief that one is free to choose to > > violate the laws of physics is generally considered pathological. I > > think most people believe that they are free to choose, for example, to > > jump off a bridge. I don't think very many people believe that having > > done so they would be free to choose not to fall. > > You have the same confusion as Tamas and Nicolas. It's not confusion, it's a different interpretation of the meaning of the phrase "(un)constrained by the laws of physics." > To believe that one > has choice unconstrained by the laws of physics is to believe that, > given two or more *physically possible* choices, one can choose > either/any, and that this choice, is not constrained by the laws of > physics. It is *not* the belief that one can choose physical > impossibilities. > > again: > > "Non-physical theories hold that a non-physical mind overrides physical > causality, so that physical events in the brain that lead to the > performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation. > This approach is allied to mind-body dualism in philosophy. According > to this view, the world is not believed to be closed under Physics. An > extra-physical will is believed to play a part in the decision making > process. According to a somewhat related theological explanation, a > soul is said to make decisions and override physical causality." Sorry, I didn't realize you were referring to dualism. I think we agree that dualism is false. I'll also go back to this: > On 2010-05-17 15:42:27 -0400, RG said: > > > Free will is only an illusion on one particular and not very useful > > definition of free will. > > But this is the definition of free will that the overwhelming majority > of people believe they have. Now I'm very confused. I was not referring to dualism, I was referring to determinism, i.e. in a deterministic universe only one choice is physically possible, and so free will (defined as the ability to make choices unconstrained by physics) must be an illusion. But under dualism, free will is not an illusion at all, it is a "real" property of the non-physical mind. In reality (on a scientific viewpoint now) the world is deterministic only at the level of the quantum wave function. On the classical level, which is to say on the approximation to the actual metaphysical truth in which classical information appears, the world is not deterministic. Hence free will is possible. Whether it is "real" or merely a very high fidelity illusion doesn't really matter. If you take science seriously you have to abandon metaphysical reality loooooong before we get to free will. The instant you take seriously your own existence you've already lost because the unavoidable metaphysical truth is, if you believe in quantum mechanics, that no thing (with the intervening space put in deliberately) "really" exists. Nonetheless, taking the existence of things as a working assumption turns out to be an exceedingly handy first order approximation. > > If Bob Felts pointed that out then he's simply wrong. > > No, he's right; most legal systems originated in an era when this sort > of mind-body or soul-body dualism was the accepted truth, a > pre-scientific belief that most people unthinkingly hew to today. Not all pre-scientific truths are wrong. And even some that are wrong turn out to be reasonable approximations to the actual truth. rg
From: Raffael Cavallaro on 17 May 2010 21:03 On 2010-05-17 20:01:14 -0400, RG said: > Now I'm very confused. I was not referring to dualism, I was referring > to determinism, i.e. in a deterministic universe only one choice is > physically possible, and so free will (defined as the ability to make > choices unconstrained by physics) must be an illusion. But under > dualism, free will is not an illusion at all, it is a "real" property of > the non-physical mind. And I'm simply saying that most people unthinkingly (and mistakenly) believe in dualism. > In reality (on a scientific viewpoint now) the world is deterministic > only at the level of the quantum wave function. On the classical level, > which is to say on the approximation to the actual metaphysical truth in > which classical information appears, the world is not deterministic. agreed so far. > > Hence free will is possible. This is where we part company. The kind of free will that is possible is not the kind that most people think of when they think they have free will. They think they have an extra-physical will or soul that makes free choices. They don't. > Whether it is "real" or merely a very high > fidelity illusion doesn't really matter. If you take science seriously > you have to abandon metaphysical reality loooooong before we get to free > will. The instant you take seriously your own existence you've already > lost because the unavoidable metaphysical truth is, if you believe in > quantum mechanics, that no thing (with the intervening space put in > deliberately) "really" exists. Nonetheless, taking the existence of > things as a working assumption turns out to be an exceedingly handy > first order approximation. > >>> If Bob Felts pointed that out then he's simply wrong. >> >> No, he's right; most legal systems originated in an era when this sort >> of mind-body or soul-body dualism was the accepted truth, a >> pre-scientific belief that most people unthinkingly hew to today. > > Not all pre-scientific truths are wrong. And even some that are wrong > turn out to be reasonable approximations to the actual truth. True, but the pre-scientific belief in dualism *is* wrong, and it isn't even a reasonable approximation to the truth, as some of the experiments I pointed to show. For example, the kind of "free will" compatible with QM you're talking is completely compatible with what are perceived to be free choices but are actually strongly constrained by magnets. However, the idea that one's "free will" choices can be strongly constrained by magnets is completely incompatible with the sort of extra-physical will or soul most people believe they have. warmest regards, Ralph -- Raffael Cavallaro
From: RG on 17 May 2010 21:21 In article <hssp12$rm2$1(a)news.eternal-september.org>, Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > On 2010-05-17 20:01:14 -0400, RG said: > > > Now I'm very confused. I was not referring to dualism, I was referring > > to determinism, i.e. in a deterministic universe only one choice is > > physically possible, and so free will (defined as the ability to make > > choices unconstrained by physics) must be an illusion. But under > > dualism, free will is not an illusion at all, it is a "real" property of > > the non-physical mind. > > And I'm simply saying that most people unthinkingly (and mistakenly) > believe in dualism. > > > In reality (on a scientific viewpoint now) the world is deterministic > > only at the level of the quantum wave function. On the classical level, > > which is to say on the approximation to the actual metaphysical truth in > > which classical information appears, the world is not deterministic. > > agreed so far. > > > > > Hence free will is possible. > > This is where we part company. The kind of free will that is possible > is not the kind that most people think of when they think they have > free will. They think they have an extra-physical will or soul that > makes free choices. They don't. What difference does it make whether people really have a soul, or whether the emergent properties of physics are indistinguishable in day-to-day life from people having a soul? > > Whether it is "real" or merely a very high > > fidelity illusion doesn't really matter. If you take science seriously > > you have to abandon metaphysical reality loooooong before we get to free > > will. The instant you take seriously your own existence you've already > > lost because the unavoidable metaphysical truth is, if you believe in > > quantum mechanics, that no thing (with the intervening space put in > > deliberately) "really" exists. Nonetheless, taking the existence of > > things as a working assumption turns out to be an exceedingly handy > > first order approximation. > > > >>> If Bob Felts pointed that out then he's simply wrong. > >> > >> No, he's right; most legal systems originated in an era when this sort > >> of mind-body or soul-body dualism was the accepted truth, a > >> pre-scientific belief that most people unthinkingly hew to today. > > > > Not all pre-scientific truths are wrong. And even some that are wrong > > turn out to be reasonable approximations to the actual truth. > > True, but the pre-scientific belief in dualism *is* wrong, and it isn't > even a reasonable approximation to the truth, as some of the > experiments I pointed to show. For example, the kind of "free will" > compatible with QM you're talking is completely compatible with what > are perceived to be free choices but are actually strongly constrained > by magnets. However, the idea that one's "free will" choices can be > strongly constrained by magnets is completely incompatible with the > sort of extra-physical will or soul most people believe they have. I disagree with your interpretation of these experiments. The magnets in particular are a red herring. You don't need to resort to magnets, you only have to point to straightforward psychological manipulation to show that people's choices can be influenced in ways that they are not aware of. Even dualists would concede that. The magnet experiments might refute dualism (though even that is arguable) but they certainly don't refute free will. It is also not at all clear that an artificial choice like twiddle-left-finger versus twiddle-right-finger can be extrapolated to real choices involving real preferences, like chocolate/vanilla, Lisp/Java, college/job, Beatles/Stones, etc. rg
From: Bob Felts on 17 May 2010 21:41
RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote: > In article <hssp12$rm2$1(a)news.eternal-september.org>, > Raffael Cavallaro > <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > [...] > > > > True, but the pre-scientific belief in dualism *is* wrong, Just curious, but you know this how, exactly? > > and it isn't even a reasonable approximation to the truth, as some of > > the experiments I pointed to show. For example, the kind of "free will" > > compatible with QM you're talking is completely compatible with what are > > perceived to be free choices but are actually strongly constrained by > > magnets. However, the idea that one's "free will" choices can be > > strongly constrained by magnets is completely incompatible with the sort > > of extra-physical will or soul most people believe they have. > > I disagree with your interpretation of these experiments. The magnets > in particular are a red herring. You don't need to resort to magnets, > you only have to point to straightforward psychological manipulation to > show that people's choices can be influenced in ways that they are not > aware of. Even dualists would concede that. The magnet experiments > might refute dualism (though even that is arguable) Indeed. I can make my Macbook go haywire with magnets. If necessary, I can reload the software. > but they certainly don't refute free will. It is also not at all clear > that an artificial choice like twiddle-left-finger versus > twiddle-right-finger can be extrapolated to real choices involving real > preferences, like chocolate/vanilla, Lisp/Java, college/job, > Beatles/Stones, etc. > While I agree with this, it's also not clear that they can't. We just don't know. |