Free will
in [Lisp]
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From: Raffael Cavallaro on 17 May 2010 16:39 On 2010-05-17 15:42:27 -0400, RG said: > Free will is only an illusion on one particular and not very useful > definition of free will. But this is the definition of free will that the overwhelming majority of people believe they have. It is, as Bob Felts points out, also the definition of free will that underlies most legal systems. So, though many familiar with the science may think this traditional definition of free will scientifically naive (or "not very useful"), it is nevertheless the one most relevant to everyday life. warmest regards, Ralph -- Raffael Cavallaro
From: Kenneth Tilton on 17 May 2010 17:46 Raffael Cavallaro wrote: > On 2010-05-17 15:42:27 -0400, RG said: > >> Free will is only an illusion on one particular and not very useful >> definition of free will. > > But this is the definition of free will that the overwhelming majority > of people believe they have. You are stuck in a massive category error and no ladder can reach you. hth,hk
From: Don Geddis on 17 May 2010 17:18 Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote on Mon, 17 May 2010: > I'd say that most people believe unthinkingly (and mistakenly) in > precisely this [naive] sort of free will. Sure, most people are wrong. Their intuitions about free will are correct, but their model of how it works is wrong. But it's a huge -- and incorrect -- step from there, to saying that free will is only an illusion, and really our subconscious "decides" everything, and we (our conscious selves) only think we decide things, but we're really being fooled. That latter model, which you have supported, is also wrong. > You seem to have an odd notion of what the term free will means. It means > that choice is unconstrained. We cannot say that a person has free will, and > also say that his choices are constrained in some way. That doesn't even make much logical sense. What would it mean for a choice to be "unconstrained", completely? What is the entity making the choice? Surely it must have some properties, i.e. "constraints". The reality is that people use "free will" to distinguish being able to choose whatever they want, from being coerced to make a choice different than what they want, based on some external influence which forces their choice. Say, blackmail, or a threat of violence, or drugs, or lack of sleep, or a recent fight with their significant other, or an addictive craving. People distinguish "self" from "other", and use free will to talk about whether they can make whatever choice the "self" wants. What most people don't realize, is that their "self" is implemented using biology, which runs on ordinary physics. And so, "what their self wants" is "constrained" by physics, and biology, and the structure of their brain, etc. But that's no reason to throw out the whole concept of free will. It's still very useful to distinguish a decision-maker that is able to decide whatever it "wants", from one that is coerced to decide something different than "it wants". In that, more useful, sense of "free will", we do indeed have free will. -- Don _______________________________________________________________________________ Don Geddis http://don.geddis.org/ don(a)geddis.org They all laughed at Albert Einstein. They all laughed at Columbus. Unfortunately, they also all laughed at Bozo the Clown. -- William H. Jefferys
From: Don Geddis on 17 May 2010 17:23 wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote on Mon, 17 May 2010: > Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: >> On 2010-05-17 11:56:43 -0400, RG said: >> >> What you are describing, is the *appearance* of free will, both >> >> outwardly and subjectively, not true unconstrained choice. >> > >> > Of course. So what? >> >> So free will is an illusion, that's what. My only point all along. > > If free will is an illusion, are we responsible for our actions? Why, > or why not? See, this is exactly why Raffael's claim that "free will is an illusion" is so useless. Because it leads naive people like Bob to make what appears to be the obvious conclusion that we're not "responsible for our actions", which is completely wrong. Do you see now, Raffael, why your proposed definition of free will ("free from all constraints") is so useless? What Bob is looking for is, are we able to make whatever choices we wish to make? The answer is yes. What if we deliberately choose to make "bad" choices? Then we're obviously responsible for them, just as naive morality suggests that we are. Nothing in science suggests that we are not responsible for our choices. This is what people _really_ mean by "free will". Not your silly wiki quote earlier. -- Don _______________________________________________________________________________ Don Geddis http://don.geddis.org/ don(a)geddis.org That's not right. It's not even wrong. -- Wolfgang Pauli
From: Bob Felts on 17 May 2010 18:39
Don Geddis <don(a)geddis.org> wrote: > wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote on Mon, 17 May 2010: > > Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> > > wrote: > >> > >> So free will is an illusion, that's what. My only point all along. > > > > If free will is an illusion, are we responsible for our actions? Why, > > or why not? > > See, this is exactly why Raffael's claim that "free will is an illusion" > is so useless. Because it leads naive people like Bob May I take exception to that remark? It's one thing to be naive; it's another to play devil's advocate. > to make what appears to be the obvious conclusion that we're not > "responsible for our actions", which is completely wrong. Historically, the argument "we're responsible because we are free moral agents", is the argument set forth by the vast majority of people. Try advancing the notion "man does not have free will, yet man is responsible" and see what type of reactions you get. [...] > What Bob is looking for is, are we able to make whatever choices we wish > to make? The answer is yes. That could be worded better. I wish that I could fly. But I can't choose it. So the wishes have to be properly constrained. Perhaps a better phrasing is, "in the set of all choices that a person could make, is that person free to choose any of them?" The answer is, no. > What if we deliberately choose to make "bad" choices? Then we're > obviously responsible for them, just as naive morality suggests that we > are. > But our courts are full of examples where "naive morality" isn't the metric used. > Nothing in science suggests that we are not responsible for our choices. In fact, science cannot suggest such a thing. Responsibility exists in the realm of morality, which exists in the world of values, which is anchorded in the universe of "ought". Science deals with "is"; it cannot deal with "ought". |