Free will
in [Lisp]
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From: Don Geddis on 17 May 2010 23:16 wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote on Mon, 17 May 2010: > Don Geddis <don(a)geddis.org> wrote: >> See, this is exactly why Raffael's claim that "free will is an illusion" >> is so useless. Because it leads naive people like Bob > > May I take exception to that remark? It's one thing to be naive; it's > another to play devil's advocate. Granted! I apologize to you. :-) >> to make what appears to be the obvious conclusion that we're not >> "responsible for our actions", which is completely wrong. > > Historically, the argument "we're responsible because we are free moral > agents", is the argument set forth by the vast majority of people. That's still true. > Try advancing the notion "man does not have free will, yet man is > responsible" and see what type of reactions you get. That's only because the label "free will" can apply to a large confusing cloud of concepts. The notion is, "man does not have free will [as described by Raffael], but does have free will [as intuitively believed by most humans], and man is therefore responsible." >> Nothing in science suggests that we are not responsible for our choices. > > In fact, science cannot suggest such a thing. Responsibility exists in > the realm of morality, which exists in the world of values, which is > anchorded in the universe of "ought". Science deals with "is"; it > cannot deal with "ought". I disagree with you, but that's a whole different topic that would distract us from the fun fun fun topic we already have in front of us. -- Don _______________________________________________________________________________ Don Geddis http://don.geddis.org/ don(a)geddis.org I wish my name was Todd, because then I could say, "Yes, my name's Todd. Todd Blankenship." Oh, also I wish my last name was Blankenship. -- Deep Thoughts, by Jack Handey
From: Nicolas Neuss on 18 May 2010 06:22 Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> writes: > True, but the pre-scientific belief in dualism *is* wrong, and it isn't > even a reasonable approximation to the truth, as some of the experiments I > pointed to show. They only show that the extreme view (physical influences do not at all influence decisions) is wrong. > For example, the kind of "free will" compatible with QM you're talking > is completely compatible with what are perceived to be free choices > but are actually strongly constrained by magnets. However, the idea > that one's "free will" choices can be strongly constrained by magnets > is completely incompatible with the sort of extra-physical will or > soul most people believe they have. You seem to assume that most people are stupid and cannot handle trivial facts. Please show me a single person stating that magnetic fields and/or drugs cannot influence his/her mental processes. > warmest regards, > > Ralph Nicolas
From: Raffael Cavallaro on 18 May 2010 08:50 On 2010-05-17 23:28:54 -0400, Don Geddis said: > The sad truth is that thousands of years > of philosophy basically made close to zero progress on the question of > free will, until the arrival of computers and AI and neuropsychology in > the last century. Which would matter if most people's notion of free will were derived from their reading on advances in neuroscience, but it isn't. The traditional definition of free will, of an extra-physical soul or will that makes choices is what most people believe they have. This dualist notion of choice has formed the basis of legal and moral systems, and the scientific evidence that it does not exist calls existing notions of moral and legal responsibility into serious question. Let me quote as well: "While our conscious experiences as such may not be responsible for our acts, we are - where "we" include our preconscious and unconscious mental processes as well as our experienced will." But this is precisely what the average person (and the legal system) does *not* mean by free will. The traditional definition of free will is *not* the idea of physical causality with the post hoc illusion of choice tacked on at the end, after the supposed choice has already been caused by a chain of unconscious processes. In fact, it is arguments of precisely this sort - that it was "preconscious and unconscious mental processes", and not the defendant's will, that made the choice - that are the basis for some pleas of insanity. So "free will" can only be rescued by redefining it into semantic absurdity. It's whole point was to set up a distinction between the realm of physical causality on the one hand, and a supra or extra-physical soul or will on the other. It's meaningless to say that we have free will as long as "free" means "physically caused" and "will" means "the post hoc illusion of agency." Similarly, "responsibility" as traditionally conceived can only be rescued by redefining the nature of responsibility into a similar absurdity, as mere proximate cause in a chain of physical causation stretching back to what? the big bang? oh, and with the post hoc illusion of agency tacked on for guilt purposes. Under this theory we should try trees for vandalism when they fall on someone's property because they are similarly "responsible." warmest regards, Ralph -- Raffael Cavallaro
From: RG on 18 May 2010 09:46 In article <hsu2e1$do4$1(a)news.eternal-september.org>, Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > On 2010-05-17 23:28:54 -0400, Don Geddis said: > > > The sad truth is that thousands of years > > of philosophy basically made close to zero progress on the question of > > free will, until the arrival of computers and AI and neuropsychology in > > the last century. > > Which would matter if most people's notion of free will were derived > from their reading on advances in neuroscience, but it isn't. The > traditional definition of free will, of an extra-physical soul or will > that makes choices is what most people believe they have. > > This dualist notion of choice has formed the basis of legal and moral > systems, and the scientific evidence that it does not exist calls > existing notions of moral and legal responsibility into serious > question. > > Let me quote as well: > > "While our conscious experiences as such may not be responsible for our > acts, we are - where "we" include our preconscious and unconscious > mental processes as well as our experienced will." > > But this is precisely what the average person (and the legal system) > does *not* mean by free will. The traditional definition of free will > is *not* the idea of physical causality with the post hoc illusion of > choice tacked on at the end, after the supposed choice has already been > caused by a chain of unconscious processes. > > In fact, it is arguments of precisely this sort - that it was > "preconscious and unconscious mental processes", and not the > defendant's will, that made the choice - that are the basis for some > pleas of insanity. > > So "free will" can only be rescued by redefining it into semantic > absurdity. No. Just because *you* can't see any other possibilities does not mean they don't exist. > It's whole point was to set up a distinction between the > realm of physical causality on the one hand, and a supra or > extra-physical soul or will on the other. It's meaningless to say that > we have free will as long as "free" means "physically caused" and > "will" means "the post hoc illusion of agency." It takes more than a constructive proof that free will *can* be defined into semantic obscurity (which no one would dispute to begin with) to show that there are no other alternatives. rg
From: Raffael Cavallaro on 18 May 2010 09:58
On 2010-05-17 21:21:25 -0400, RG said: > What difference does it make whether people really have a soul, or > whether the emergent properties of physics are indistinguishable in > day-to-day life from people having a soul? But they are distinguishable. Remember, the supposed soul or will is free from physical constraints in its choices. If we can change what is felt to be a free a choice between two or more real possibilities by means of some physical cause, we have a reality that is incompatible with the dualist notion of free will, however compatible it is with physics in general. That physical cause, as you yourself point out, need not be something exotic like a powerful magnetic field, but can be something as pedestrian as everyday psychological influence. We now know that what we feel to be our "will" comes after the physical causation. That any emergent property due to quantum indeterminacy (or any other physical process) in that chain of physical causation is the effective equivalent of a soul or will is unproven speculation. Moreover, the hypothetical emergent soul is subject to magnetic fields, while the dualist one is not; the emergent soul must bow to any and all experimentally demonstrated influences on choice, while the extra-physical dualist soul blithely ignores all physical causation; if each of the choices is a real possibility, the dualist soul can choose any of them, and physical causation is irrelevant to which choice is made. Not so for the hypothetical emergent soul. > >>> Whether it is "real" or merely a very high >>> fidelity illusion doesn't really matter. If you take science seriously >>> you have to abandon metaphysical reality loooooong before we get to free >>> will. The instant you take seriously your own existence you've already >>> lost because the unavoidable metaphysical truth is, if you believe in >>> quantum mechanics, that no thing (with the intervening space put in >>> deliberately) "really" exists. Nonetheless, taking the existence of >>> things as a working assumption turns out to be an exceedingly handy >>> first order approximation. >>> >>>>> If Bob Felts pointed that out then he's simply wrong. >>>> >>>> No, he's right; most legal systems originated in an era when this sort >>>> of mind-body or soul-body dualism was the accepted truth, a >>>> pre-scientific belief that most people unthinkingly hew to today. >>> >>> Not all pre-scientific truths are wrong. And even some that are wrong >>> turn out to be reasonable approximations to the actual truth. >> >> True, but the pre-scientific belief in dualism *is* wrong, and it isn't >> even a reasonable approximation to the truth, as some of the >> experiments I pointed to show. For example, the kind of "free will" >> compatible with QM you're talking is completely compatible with what >> are perceived to be free choices but are actually strongly constrained >> by magnets. However, the idea that one's "free will" choices can be >> strongly constrained by magnets is completely incompatible with the >> sort of extra-physical will or soul most people believe they have. > > I disagree with your interpretation of these experiments. The magnets > in particular are a red herring. You don't need to resort to magnets, > you only have to point to straightforward psychological manipulation to > show that people's choices can be influenced in ways that they are not > aware of. The magnets make for a demonstration that is much simpler and more elegant. The magnet is a purely physical cause, and souls/ wills are supposed to be free of these when making a choice. warmest regards, Ralph -- Raffael Cavallaro |