Free will
in [Lisp]
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From: Raffael Cavallaro on 18 May 2010 12:00 On 2010-05-18 10:30:00 -0400, RG said: > In article <hsu6dq$sjq$1(a)news.eternal-september.org>, > Raffael Cavallaro > <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > >> the extra-physical dualist soul blithely ignores all physical causation > > That is a ridiculous straw man. Even dualists will readily concede that > physical reward and punishment can influence choices. You're again conflating the act of choice itself with the context in which the choice is made. No, you can't choose not to fall once having jumped off a bridge, or choose to withstand excruciating pain endlessly. The dualist notion is that within the choice-space of real possibilities, the act of choice is not subject to physical laws, not that we can choose the impossible. Once you introduce torture, we're outside of the realm of free choice. > >>> I disagree with your interpretation of these experiments. The magnets >>> in particular are a red herring. You don't need to resort to magnets, >>> you only have to point to straightforward psychological manipulation to >>> show that people's choices can be influenced in ways that they are not >>> aware of. >> >> The magnets make for a demonstration that is much simpler and more >> elegant. The magnet is a purely physical cause, and souls/ wills are >> supposed to be free of these when making a choice. > > The rack was a purely physical cause too, but you'd be hard pressed to > find a dualist who will claim that the soul was free of its influences. > In fact, that was, at least ostensibly, the whole *point* of torture: to > influence the soul. > > There's more to say about this, but you are already so far off the rails > here that it's probably pointless. > > rg Pointless, possibly, but rather because you mischaracterize free will and ignore the experimental evidence, for which your only counter is a purely hypothetical emergent free will equivalent. warmest regards, Ralph P.S. accusing me of going "off the rails" is the sort of rhetorical trick that might incite Madhu to ranting, but I'm saddened to see that you thought it would work on me. Ironically, it suggests that you think I am lacking in free will, and would therefore reflexively rise to the bait ;^) -- Raffael Cavallaro
From: Vend on 18 May 2010 12:09 On 18 Mag, 00:45, Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavall...(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > You'll have to forgive me if I continue to rely on a definition edited > and reviewed by philosophers, consistent with historical philosophical > usage, consistent with the history of religion, and consistent with the > history of legal systems, rather than your emphatically stated, but > otherwise unsupported assertion of what people "_really_ mean." I don't think that your definition is consistent with the history of religion and legal systems.
From: Raffael Cavallaro on 18 May 2010 12:11 On 2010-05-18 09:46:22 -0400, RG said: > No. Just because *you* can't see any other possibilities does not mean > they don't exist. Provide such an alternative, supported by experimental evidence, or accept that the best available explanation of existing evidence is that our perception that we have free will is illusory. warmest regards, Ralph -- Raffael Cavallaro
From: Vend on 18 May 2010 12:30 On 18 Mag, 01:14, Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavall...(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > You have the same confusion as Tamas and Nicolas. To believe that one > has choice unconstrained by the laws of physics is to believe that, > given two or more *physically possible* choices, one can choose > either/any, and that this choice, is not constrained by the laws of > physics. This belief is a tautology. If there are multiple physically possible choices (nondeterminism is true), then by definition of "physically possible" the laws of physics don't constrain the choice. If there are never multiple physically possible choices (determinism is true), then the belief is still correct, since implication is true if the premise is false.
From: RG on 18 May 2010 12:33
In article <hsudiu$plo$1(a)news.eternal-september.org>, Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > On 2010-05-18 10:30:00 -0400, RG said: > > > In article <hsu6dq$sjq$1(a)news.eternal-september.org>, > > Raffael Cavallaro > > <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > > > >> the extra-physical dualist soul blithely ignores all physical causation > > > > That is a ridiculous straw man. Even dualists will readily concede that > > physical reward and punishment can influence choices. > > You're again conflating the act of choice itself with the context in > which the choice is made. No, you can't choose not to fall once having > jumped off a bridge, or choose to withstand excruciating pain > endlessly. The dualist notion is that within the choice-space of real > possibilities, the act of choice is not subject to physical laws, not > that we can choose the impossible. Once you introduce torture, we're > outside of the realm of free choice. Not at all. Torture is just one extreme of a continuum. Do you choose to endure the pain or betray your comrades? Do you choose to endure hunger or gain weight? Do you choose the pain of chemotherapy or let the cancer run its course? Do you choose to put up with your PITA boss or being evicted because you can't pay the rent? In each of these cases the choice is influenced by external physical factors, but no dualist (I would go so far as to say no reasonably person) would deny that free will is at work as well. > >>> I disagree with your interpretation of these experiments. The magnets > >>> in particular are a red herring. You don't need to resort to magnets, > >>> you only have to point to straightforward psychological manipulation to > >>> show that people's choices can be influenced in ways that they are not > >>> aware of. > >> > >> The magnets make for a demonstration that is much simpler and more > >> elegant. The magnet is a purely physical cause, and souls/ wills are > >> supposed to be free of these when making a choice. > > > > The rack was a purely physical cause too, but you'd be hard pressed to > > find a dualist who will claim that the soul was free of its influences. > > In fact, that was, at least ostensibly, the whole *point* of torture: to > > influence the soul. > > > > There's more to say about this, but you are already so far off the rails > > here that it's probably pointless. > > > > rg > > Pointless, possibly, but rather because you mischaracterize free will > and ignore the experimental evidence, for which your only counter is a > purely hypothetical emergent free will equivalent. I would characterize it as an alternative definition of free will, a definition that is consistent with experiment, and one that has actual utility. > P.S. accusing me of going "off the rails" is the sort of rhetorical > trick that might incite Madhu to ranting, but I'm saddened to see that > you thought it would work on me. Ironically, it suggests that you think > I am lacking in free will, and would therefore reflexively rise to the > bait ;^) You assume that my purpose was to incite you. It wasn't. It was just a colorful way of saying that your position is so far from the truth and based on so many false assumptions that attempting to refute it in detail would likely be a waste of effort. rg |