Free will
in [Lisp]
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From: RG on 18 May 2010 10:07 In article <1jinny3.mbf2yd1ut8zkyN%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > > > and it isn't even a reasonable approximation to the truth, as some of > > > the experiments I pointed to show. For example, the kind of "free will" > > > compatible with QM you're talking is completely compatible with what are > > > perceived to be free choices but are actually strongly constrained by > > > magnets. However, the idea that one's "free will" choices can be > > > strongly constrained by magnets is completely incompatible with the sort > > > of extra-physical will or soul most people believe they have. > > > > I disagree with your interpretation of these experiments. The magnets > > in particular are a red herring. You don't need to resort to magnets, > > you only have to point to straightforward psychological manipulation to > > show that people's choices can be influenced in ways that they are not > > aware of. Even dualists would concede that. The magnet experiments > > might refute dualism (though even that is arguable) > > Indeed. I can make my Macbook go haywire with magnets. If necessary, I > can reload the software. Huh? > > but they certainly don't refute free will. It is also not at all clear > > that an artificial choice like twiddle-left-finger versus > > twiddle-right-finger can be extrapolated to real choices involving real > > preferences, like chocolate/vanilla, Lisp/Java, college/job, > > Beatles/Stones, etc. > > > > While I agree with this, it's also not clear that they can't. We just > don't know. That's exactly right. It's so exactly right that it's worth expanding on. Rafael claims that dualism is essential to free will, but this is, as Kenny said earlier in this thread, a category error. Free will is not about cause, it is about effect. Specifically, free will refers (Wikipedia notwithstanding) to a certain kind of information asymmetry: *I* can know why (or that) I choose to do X, but you can't unless I tell you. Whether that information asymmetry is "really" caused (whatever that might mean) by an extra-physical soul, or preconscious mental processes, or quantum randomness, or the flying spaghetti monster doesn't matter. What matters is simply the information asymmetry. Note that this theory of free will is completely consistent with both science and contemporary legal theory. Sometimes a person makes choices where even they don't know why (and sometimes not even that) they made them. The law treats those cases differently because there is no information asymmetry and hence no free will. If someone comes up with a theory that allows them to predict (or control) *all* of someone else's choices then that information asymmetry will disappear, taking free will along with it. But until that happens, the information asymmetry, and hence free will, persists. rg
From: Raffael Cavallaro on 18 May 2010 10:20 On 2010-05-18 06:22:50 -0400, Nicolas Neuss said: > >> True, but the pre-scientific belief in dualism *is* wrong, and it isn't >> even a reasonable approximation to the truth, as some of the experiments I >> pointed to show. > > They only show that the extreme view (physical influences do not at all > influence decisions) is wrong. This dualist view and the concomitant subjective sense of free choice is the foundation of our legal and moral systems. So proving experimentally that it is an illusion has significant implications. > >> For example, the kind of "free will" compatible with QM you're talking >> is completely compatible with what are perceived to be free choices >> but are actually strongly constrained by magnets. However, the idea >> that one's "free will" choices can be strongly constrained by magnets >> is completely incompatible with the sort of extra-physical will or >> soul most people believe they have. > > You seem to assume that most people are stupid and cannot handle trivial > facts. Please show me a single person stating that magnetic fields > and/or drugs cannot influence his/her mental processes. That drugs can influence mental processes is not news, but one generally doesn't subjectively feel the same under the influence of drugs - i.e., one generally knows one has been drugged or taken drugs. The whole point of the magnet experiment is that the subjects continued to feel that their choices were just as free as without the magnets, even though their choices were clearly distorted by a very strong influence. I just discussed this with two highly educated people - both with law degrees from one of the top 2 law schools in the US, one a professor of law, the other a judge. Both were surprised to hear these experimental results, and reflexively recoiled at the notion that our perception of free choice is a post hoc illusion. So though it may be a "trivial fact" to you that magnetic fields can drastically change what people nevertheless feel to be free will choices, or that our perception of free will is a post hoc illusion, I can assure you that this knowledge is not widespread in the legal community. If this is surprising news among the legal profession, how much more so to lay people? warmest regards, Ralph -- Raffael Cavallaro
From: RG on 18 May 2010 10:30 In article <hsu6dq$sjq$1(a)news.eternal-september.org>, Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > the extra-physical dualist soul blithely ignores all physical causation That is a ridiculous straw man. Even dualists will readily concede that physical reward and punishment can influence choices. > > I disagree with your interpretation of these experiments. The magnets > > in particular are a red herring. You don't need to resort to magnets, > > you only have to point to straightforward psychological manipulation to > > show that people's choices can be influenced in ways that they are not > > aware of. > > The magnets make for a demonstration that is much simpler and more > elegant. The magnet is a purely physical cause, and souls/ wills are > supposed to be free of these when making a choice. The rack was a purely physical cause too, but you'd be hard pressed to find a dualist who will claim that the soul was free of its influences. In fact, that was, at least ostensibly, the whole *point* of torture: to influence the soul. There's more to say about this, but you are already so far off the rails here that it's probably pointless. rg
From: Raffael Cavallaro on 18 May 2010 11:23 On 2010-05-18 10:07:16 -0400, RG said: > Free will is not > about cause, it is about effect. This again redefines free will into meaninglessness. The whole point of free will is that the individual is the cause of his actions. Free will does not mean that the individual's actions are an effect of some other cause over which he has no control, with a post hoc illusion of agency (no matter how unknowable that post hoc illusion may be to others). > Specifically, free will refers > (Wikipedia notwithstanding) to a certain kind of information asymmetry: > *I* can know why (or that) I choose to do X, but you can't unless I tell > you. You can know why (or that) you *believe* you choose to do X, and I can't know what you *believe* about your choice (unless you tell me), but that doesn't make your belief as to why you did something true. For an amusing example consider this experiment with a patient whose corpus callosum had been surgically severed, a so-called "split brain" patient: "In another experiment, the patient's right hemisphere saw a picture of a snow-covered landscape, and his left hemisphere saw a picture of a chicken claw. The patient's right hand pointed to a picture of a chicken, while the patient's left hand pointed to a picture of a snow shovel. (The right hemisphere controls the left hand, and vice-versa.) The patient was then asked why his left hand was pointing to the snow shovel. The left hemisphere, unable to see the picture of the chicken claw, responded by pointing out that he'd need a shovel to clean out a chicken shed." IOW, the subjective perception of what caused the subject's actions is mistaken - we know why the subject chose a shovel, but his conscious, verbal, self does not. By your information asymmetry theory, this person does not have free will because we know what caused the subject's choice, but the subject does not. This just demonstrates that the notion of information asymmetry is irrelevant - the patient has as much (or, I would say, as little) free will as anyone else, it's just that the patient's illusion of autonomy is made obvious to us, while our personal illusions have not, in general, been demolished experimentally. warmest regards, Ralph -- Raffael Cavallaro
From: Vend on 18 May 2010 11:54
On 17 Mag, 16:59, Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavall...(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > On 2010-05-17 02:46:10 -0400, RG said: > > > If course we can. Repeat after me: > > > "I have free will, and (or, if you prefer, despite the fact that) my > > choices are constrained by the laws of physics." > > "Free will is the purported ability of agents to make choices free from > constraints." > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will> > > Yours is the compatibilist position. It is only tenable if you redefine > free will; i.e., there may very well be some concept that is compatible > with the notion of constraint by the laws of physics, constraint by > existing brain state, constraint by existing personal psychology, etc., > but that thing certainly isn't free will as traditionally defined above. That so called "traditional" definition you quoted from Wikipedia is useless without qualification of which constraints are considered. If you consider all constraints, then only an omnipotent being would have free will. |