Free will
in [Lisp]
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From: RG on 18 May 2010 16:40 In article <hsus43$lcm$1(a)news.eternal-september.org>, Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > On 2010-05-18 15:50:17 -0400, RG said: > > > The prisoner believes that he has made a > > free choice (admittedly from among two very bad alternatives, but free > > nonetheless) but an external observer knows that the choice was in fact > > coerced. The only difference between this story and your magnets is > > that the mechanism by which the coercion is happening is more > > transparent. > > If you seriously think that there's no difference in coercion between a > prisoner threatened with death or amputation on the one hand, and > someone unknowingly subjected to a magnetic field on the other while > pressing one of two buttons with no consequence, then you clearly don't > know what coercion means. > > Again, this is all about our subjective perceptions. The prisoner > perceives himself to be strongly coerced - he would not choose either > amputation or death except for the fact that he is under duress, > regardless of any fictional tale about a supposed rescue. And the subject of the original experiment might really want a chocolate ice cream. But the only choices available to him are lift-left-finger or lift-right-finger, so that's what he chooses. It is only a difference of degree. A pretty extreme difference in degree I will grant you, but a difference only in degree nonetheless. > The subject of the magnet experiment does not feel himself to be in any > way coerced. The magnet subject's perception is broken, because his > choice is in fact being strongly constrained - he just isn't a reliable > evaluator of what is actually causing his actions. This and other > experiments show that none of us are. I'll concoct a more benign example then. Consider a well connected stock broker who feeds a false news report to reputable publisher. The broker's counterparts believe their subsequent decisions to buy or sell based on this news report to be freely chosen, but the broker who issued the false report knows those decisions to be coerced. rg
From: Raffael Cavallaro on 18 May 2010 16:47 On 2010-05-18 16:07:11 -0400, RG said: > My position is that this post-hoc > illusion of free will acts for all intents and purposes as if it were > "real" free will in everyday situations, and so "real" free will is > perfectly adequate as an operational assumption for the conduct of > everyday life. Because the illusion is not comparable to real free will, as experiments involving psychological priming (but not outright coercion) show: "In one experiment, participants were first exposed to words related to either rudeness (e.g., rude, impolite, obnoxious), politeness (e.g., respect, considerate, polite) or neither (in the control condition) in an initial "language experiment." They were then given a chance to interrupt an ongoing conversation (in order to ask for the promised next experimental task). Significantly more participants in the "rude" priming condition interrupted (67%) than did those in the control condition (38%), whereas only 16% of those primed with "polite" interrupted the conversation." from <http://www.psychology.pl/download/Emotions_and_Motivation_II/The_Unbearable_Automaticity_of_Being.pdf> [1] The subjects do not feel that their choices are constrained, but they in fact are. So their subjective illusion is *not* "for all intents and purposes as if it were "real" free will." > You seem to disagree with that, but you have not yet > offered any actual reason for your disagreement other than "it's just > not true." And so I keep coming back to the fact that our mere > existence as classical physical entities is also a post-hoc illusion, > and the proposition that you and I exist is also just-not-true. So why > are you so apparently willing to accept the approximation of your > classical physical existence but not the equally high fidelity > approximation of "actual" free will? It's the other way round; your assertion is special pleading. By way of contrast, the blind spot illusion suggests that our subjective visual perception papers over the two large blind spots in our visual field where the optic nerve meets the retina. But you do not feel compelled to assert that some aspect of quantum indeterminacy or somesuch makes our visual perception "for all intents and purposes" the same as that of a video camera covering the same scene. You only make your free will argument because you attribute special status to this particular aspect of human perception. But scientific argument doesn't allow for some phenomena to have special evidentiary or explanatory status. The same evidentiary and logical standard applies to free will as to visual blind spots; we choose the explanation that most economically explains the experimental evidence. Here, that explanation is simply that free will is a perceptual illusion, nothing more. [1] btw, read this paper for an examination of just how un-free we are in everyday life. -- Raffael Cavallaro
From: Raffael Cavallaro on 18 May 2010 16:49 On 2010-05-18 16:40:10 -0400, RG said: > It is only a > difference of degree. A pretty extreme difference in degree I will > grant you, but a difference only in degree nonetheless. Extreme differences of degree are effectively differences of kind. By this sort of sophistry, strangulation is just "extreme tickling." warmest regards, Ralph -- Raffael Cavallaro
From: Vend on 18 May 2010 16:58 On 18 Mag, 21:25, Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavall...(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > On 2010-05-18 12:30:51 -0400, Vend said: > > > On 18 Mag, 01:14, Raffael Cavallaro > > <raffaelcavall...(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > > >> You have the same confusion as Tamas and Nicolas. To believe that one > >> has choice unconstrained by the laws of physics is to believe that, > >> given two or more *physically possible* choices, one can choose > >> either/any, and that this choice, is not constrained by the laws of > >> physics. > > > This belief is a tautology. > > > If there are multiple physically possible choices (nondeterminism is > > true), then by definition of "physically possible" the laws of physics > > don't constrain the choice. > > Yes, dualism is logically consistent; it just isn't supported by the > experimental evidence, that's all. > > > > > If there are never multiple physically possible choices (determinism > > is true), then the belief is still correct, > > the belief? what belief? The statement "if there are multiple physically possible choices then one can choose any of them" is true even under determinism. Because under determinism the condition "there are multiple physically possible choices" is false, and by the laws of logic, any conditional statement with a false condition is true. > The belief that "one has choice unconstrained > by the laws of physics" This is a different statement, and it is false even under dualism, unless you want to claim that one is omnipotent.
From: Bob Felts on 18 May 2010 17:18
RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote: > In article <1jinny3.mbf2yd1ut8zkyN%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, > wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > > > > > and it isn't even a reasonable approximation to the truth, as some > > > > of the experiments I pointed to show. For example, the kind of "free > > > > will" compatible with QM you're talking is completely compatible > > > > with what are perceived to be free choices but are actually strongly > > > > constrained by magnets. However, the idea that one's "free will" > > > > choices can be strongly constrained by magnets is completely > > > > incompatible with the sort of extra-physical will or soul most > > > > people believe they have. > > > > > > I disagree with your interpretation of these experiments. The magnets > > > in particular are a red herring. You don't need to resort to magnets, > > > you only have to point to straightforward psychological manipulation > > > to show that people's choices can be influenced in ways that they are > > > not aware of. Even dualists would concede that. The magnet > > > experiments might refute dualism (though even that is arguable) > > > > Indeed. I can make my Macbook go haywire with magnets. If necessary, I > > can reload the software. > > Huh? It is arguable that magnet experiments might refute dualism. Affecting the hardware of the brain is no different than affecting the hardware of a computer. It says nothing about the software, especially about its source. I can smash my Macbook (oh, the horror), but it isn't gone. I can restore it from a backup. All these experiments do is provide an explanation that is consistent with the materialist worldview; it does not confirm the materialist worldview. Indeed, it cannot. (A -> B) & B, does not prove A. |