Thoughts are objects, mind and brain are identical
in [Physics]
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From: BURT on 15 Jun 2010 21:12 On Jun 15, 4:24 pm, Immortalista <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > One form of materialism is the view that mental states are identical > with brain states. To have a certain kind of mental state is the same > thing as having a certain type of brain state. To think a certain sort > of thought is to have a certain sort of thing happen in the brain. To > feel pain is to have another sort of thing happen in the brain. To > wish for good weather is to have another sort of thing happen in the > brain. This theory is called the mind-brain identity theory. > > Persons And Their World: An Introduction to Philosophy - Jeffrey Olenhttp://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0075543117/ > > Mental states are objects, like tables or chairs. They are events, > like the kicking of a football. Thinking is a mental state, an object. > So are wishing and hoping and dreaming objects if objects are just > events. These are all mental events, things that we do. Therefore > there are such "objects" as thoughts, wishes, hopes,, or images. > > What is the difference between an event and an object? No difference > because all known objects are events based upon interactive processes. > (Nominalism) An event is a happening, an occurrence. It is what > objects do, what happens to objects. Take, for example, the event of > kicking a football. If I kick a football, there are only two objects > involved-me and the ball. There is also the event of my kicking the > ball, but that event is not a third object True, we sometimes talk as > though there were such objects as kicks. We say that someone made a > good kick, or that a kick saved a game, or that a field-goal kicker > made five kicks during a game. But that is just a manner of speaking. > There are no such objects as kicks. > > Similarly, there are such objects as handshakes. If I shake a friend's > hand, the objects involved are my hand and my friend's hand. We can > talk as though there were a third thing. We can say, for example, that > I gave my friend a firm handshake, which is really like giving someone > a firm container. To give a firm handshake is to shake hands firmly. > That is, there is only the event of shaking hands, but no such object > as a handshake. Shaking hands is something we do. The human brain is wired and netted to the truth. You can live that way to get superior. Mitch Raemsch
From: Akira Bergman on 15 Jun 2010 21:40 On Jun 16, 10:30 am, "Androcles" <Headmas...(a)Hogwarts.physics_z> wrote: > "Immortalista" <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote in message > > news:cb98da81-4358-45a7-a9c5-143f7ff38cd5(a)y18g2000prn.googlegroups.com... > | One form of materialism is the view that mental states are identical > | with brain states. To have a certain kind of mental state is the same > | thing as having a certain type of brain state. > > Couldn't you just say software differs from hardware, or haven't > you learnt about computers yet? The television is not the image on > the screen or the sound in the speaker, the body is not the soul. > Only engineers are interested in televisions, only surgeons are > interested in anatomy. The rest of the world wants to laugh at > the comedian on the screen or be shocked by the news. > The mind is software, the brain is hardware. They are not the same. > Go away, you are trivially not funny and intellectually boring. The software-hardware is distinction of convenience, like energy- matter which unify to information under the advanced theories of physics like the string theory and the quantum gravity. All classifications are relative to the economy of the specific observation, and ultimately they all unite under the theories of information. This unity is clearly reflected in computers; software ends up becoming hardware and vice versa. Dynamic states are reflected in a state of a solid state device like a flip-flop which is a device made of two transistors pointing to each other. This state is an amount of trapped energy. Similar logic goes for semi-static and static states. Energy is matter, matter is energy, and both are information. In the end, all are self referring information.
From: chibiabos on 15 Jun 2010 21:45 In article <cb98da81-4358-45a7-a9c5-143f7ff38cd5(a)y18g2000prn.googlegroups.com>, Immortalista <extropy1(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > One form of materialism is the view that mental states are identical > with brain states. To have a certain kind of mental state is the same > thing as having a certain type of brain state. To think a certain sort > of thought is to have a certain sort of thing happen in the brain. To > feel pain is to have another sort of thing happen in the brain. To > wish for good weather is to have another sort of thing happen in the > brain. This theory is called the mind-brain identity theory. > > Persons And Their World: An Introduction to Philosophy - Jeffrey Olen > http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0075543117/ > > Mental states are objects, like tables or chairs. They are events, > like the kicking of a football. Thinking is a mental state, an object. > So are wishing and hoping and dreaming objects if objects are just > events. These are all mental events, things that we do. Therefore > there are such "objects" as thoughts, wishes, hopes,, or images. > > What is the difference between an event and an object? No difference > because all known objects are events based upon interactive processes. > (Nominalism) An event is a happening, an occurrence. It is what > objects do, what happens to objects. Take, for example, the event of > kicking a football. If I kick a football, there are only two objects > involved-me and the ball. There is also the event of my kicking the > ball, but that event is not a third object True, we sometimes talk as > though there were such objects as kicks. We say that someone made a > good kick, or that a kick saved a game, or that a field-goal kicker > made five kicks during a game. But that is just a manner of speaking. > There are no such objects as kicks. > > Similarly, there are such objects as handshakes. If I shake a friend's > hand, the objects involved are my hand and my friend's hand. We can > talk as though there were a third thing. We can say, for example, that > I gave my friend a firm handshake, which is really like giving someone > a firm container. To give a firm handshake is to shake hands firmly. > That is, there is only the event of shaking hands, but no such object > as a handshake. Shaking hands is something we do. Fritz Perls much? -chib -- Member of S.M.A.S.H. Sarcastic Middle-aged Atheists with a Sense of Humor
From: Immortalist on 15 Jun 2010 21:55 On Jun 15, 6:08 pm, John Stafford <n...(a)droffats.ten> wrote: > In article <LWURn.39210$YG4.34...(a)newsfe10.ams2>, > > "Androcles" <Headmas...(a)Hogwarts.physics_z> wrote: > > "Immortalista" <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote in message > >news:cb98da81-4358-45a7-a9c5-143f7ff38cd5(a)y18g2000prn.googlegroups.com.... > > | One form of materialism is the view that mental states are identical > > | with brain states. To have a certain kind of mental state is the same > > | thing as having a certain type of brain state. > > > Couldn't you just say software differs from hardware, or haven't > > you learnt about computers yet? The television is not the image on > > the screen or the sound in the speaker, the body is not the soul. > > Only engineers are interested in televisions, only surgeons are > > interested in anatomy. The rest of the world wants to laugh at > > the comedian on the screen or be shocked by the news. > > The mind is software, the brain is hardware. They are not the same. > > Go away, you are trivially not funny and intellectually boring. > > Excellent thread. > > The brain is not a binary thing. > > Should we express what we call software and hardware analogies when > addressing the human mind/brain issue? When we know that each term is > simply taken from the discourse of current technology. I would look for > another explanation of the relationship. The brain is not air, fire and > water. By the same measure, it is not analog/digital. Maybe he was hinting at the theory of Functionalism where it doesn't matter what something is made of as long as it performs the same steps in the program. Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part. This doctrine is rooted in Aristotle's conception of the soul, and has antecedents in Hobbes's conception of the mind as a calculating machine, but it has become fully articulated (and popularly endorsed) only in the last third of the 20th century. Though the term functionalism is used to designate a variety of positions in a variety of other disciplines, including psychology, sociology, economics, and architecture, this entry focuses exclusively on functionalism as a philosophical thesis about the nature of mental states. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ But, is out subjective experience just a "circuit function" or is it a "circuit property"? If the former then we any old massive amounts of circuitry could emulate a self with feeling an all, but if the later we may need the additional layer of functional equivalents of the material and quantum properties of nerve cells acting together. So we could achieve consciousness either way its just the later is more complex simulation/emulation since quantum fields just come with the material organization. ----------------- Similar remarks apply to computers. There are two ways to describe the workings of a computer. A physical description will describe the workings of the circuits, the flow of electricity, and so forth. But that is not how we usually describe the workings of a computer. More often than not, we give an abstract description of it. To give an abstract description of a computer's workings is to talk about the program it is following. It is to describe it as performing certain computations. A computer program is like a game of chess. Its description is totally abstract. Any number of physical machines can embody a particular program. And the same physical machine can embody any number of different programs. Suppose, then, that a computer is adding two and two. In that case, certain things are happening in the machine in accordance with a certain program. What makes those physical happenings the addition of two and two is the program. Just as any physical object can be a knight if it functions according to the proper rules, so can any machine activity be the addition of two and two if it functions according to the proper rules. According to the functionalist, the brain is like the chess pieces and the physical computer. We can describe its workings in two ways. If we describe its workings in neurophysiological terms, we are giving a physical description of it. If we describe its workings in mental terms, we are giving an abstract description of it.
From: raven1 on 15 Jun 2010 21:55
On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 17:28:02 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist <reanimater_2000(a)yahoo.com> wrote: >On Jun 15, 5:02�pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 16:24:34 -0700 (PDT), Immortalista >> >> >> >> <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: >> >One form of materialism is the view that mental states are identical >> >with brain states. To have a certain kind of mental state is the same >> >thing as having a certain type of brain state. To think a certain sort >> >of thought is to have a certain sort of thing happen in the brain. To >> >feel pain is to have another sort of thing happen in the brain. To >> >wish for good weather is to have another sort of thing happen in the >> >brain. This theory is called the mind-brain identity theory. >> >> >Persons And Their World: An Introduction to Philosophy - Jeffrey Olen >> >http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0075543117/ >> >> >Mental states are objects, like tables or chairs. They are events, >> >like the kicking of a football. Thinking is a mental state, an object. >> >So are wishing and hoping and dreaming objects if objects are just >> >events. These are all mental events, things that we do. Therefore >> >there are such "objects" as thoughts, wishes, hopes,, or images. >> >> >What is the difference between an event and an object? No difference >> >because all known objects are events based upon interactive processes. >> >(Nominalism) An event is a happening, an occurrence. It is what >> >objects do, what happens to objects. Take, for example, the event of >> >kicking a football. If I kick a football, there are only two objects >> >involved-me and the ball. There is also the event of my kicking the >> >ball, but that event is not a third object True, we sometimes talk as >> >though there were such objects as kicks. We say that someone made a >> >good kick, or that a kick saved a game, or that a field-goal kicker >> >made five kicks during a game. But that is just a manner of speaking. >> >There are no such objects as kicks. >> >> >Similarly, there are such objects as handshakes. If I shake a friend's >> >hand, the objects involved are my hand and my friend's hand. We can >> >talk as though there were a third thing. We can say, for example, that >> >I gave my friend a firm handshake, which is really like giving someone >> >a firm container. To give a firm handshake is to shake hands firmly. >> >That is, there is only the event of shaking hands, but no such object >> >as a handshake. Shaking hands is something we do. >> >> Congratulations. You appear to have discovered the difference between >> verbs and nouns. Did you have a point? > >Can you explain your theory about nouns and verbs and how it applies >to what I typed? Sorry, what I wrote was incomplete. You also apparently understand adjectives and adverbs. That said, I'm still at a loss as to what your point was in the first place. Would you mind explaining just what exactly it is that you're trying to say? |