Thoughts are objects, mind and brain are identical
in [Physics]
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From: Immortalist on 16 Jun 2010 20:05 On Jun 15, 7:41 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: > On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 19:12:02 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist > > > > <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > >On Jun 15, 6:55 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: > >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 17:28:02 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist > > >> <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > >> >On Jun 15, 5:02 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: > >> >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 16:24:34 -0700 (PDT), Immortalista > > >> >> <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > >> >> >One form of materialism is the view that mental states are identical > >> >> >with brain states. To have a certain kind of mental state is the same > >> >> >thing as having a certain type of brain state. To think a certain sort > >> >> >of thought is to have a certain sort of thing happen in the brain. To > >> >> >feel pain is to have another sort of thing happen in the brain. To > >> >> >wish for good weather is to have another sort of thing happen in the > >> >> >brain. This theory is called the mind-brain identity theory. > > >> >> >Persons And Their World: An Introduction to Philosophy - Jeffrey Olen > >> >> >http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0075543117/ > > >> >> >Mental states are objects, like tables or chairs. They are events, > >> >> >like the kicking of a football. Thinking is a mental state, an object. > >> >> >So are wishing and hoping and dreaming objects if objects are just > >> >> >events. These are all mental events, things that we do. Therefore > >> >> >there are such "objects" as thoughts, wishes, hopes,, or images. > > >> >> >What is the difference between an event and an object? No difference > >> >> >because all known objects are events based upon interactive processes. > >> >> >(Nominalism) An event is a happening, an occurrence. It is what > >> >> >objects do, what happens to objects. Take, for example, the event of > >> >> >kicking a football. If I kick a football, there are only two objects > >> >> >involved-me and the ball. There is also the event of my kicking the > >> >> >ball, but that event is not a third object True, we sometimes talk as > >> >> >though there were such objects as kicks. We say that someone made a > >> >> >good kick, or that a kick saved a game, or that a field-goal kicker > >> >> >made five kicks during a game. But that is just a manner of speaking. > >> >> >There are no such objects as kicks. > > >> >> >Similarly, there are such objects as handshakes. If I shake a friend's > >> >> >hand, the objects involved are my hand and my friend's hand. We can > >> >> >talk as though there were a third thing. We can say, for example, that > >> >> >I gave my friend a firm handshake, which is really like giving someone > >> >> >a firm container. To give a firm handshake is to shake hands firmly. > >> >> >That is, there is only the event of shaking hands, but no such object > >> >> >as a handshake. Shaking hands is something we do. > > >> >> Congratulations. You appear to have discovered the difference between > >> >> verbs and nouns. Did you have a point? > > >> >Can you explain your theory about nouns and verbs and how it applies > >> >to what I typed? > > >> Sorry, what I wrote was incomplete. You also apparently understand > >> adjectives and adverbs. > > >> That said, I'm still at a loss as to what your point was in the first > >> place. Would you mind explaining just what exactly it is that you're > >> trying to say? > > >I suppose that I was experimenting with the idea that "If all known > >objects are processes then it may be the case that all known processes > >are objects." > > Stop right there. That sentence makes no sense unless you're using > your own personal definition of "objects", "processes", or both. > In physics no "atom" or smallest particle has been found which is not a "process" instead of a thing. The history of the "atomic theory" has led from intuitive units in the Greeks to subatomic particles currently to possibly "strings". But as yet all known object including particle are changing states of fields or smaller particles. Therefore all known objects are just processes which are interactions of changing relationships between other processes. > >That would be the fallacy of affirming the consequent in > >logic so I am trying to learn how to argue the position. > > It would help if you were to define your terms coherently. > Ha, check that out. You know for the last decade I get complaints to not define and explain myself so thoroughly. I am the pasting man because I will flood you with "excellently to the point jizz" Affirming the consequent Affirming the consequent is a logical fallacy in the form of a hypothetical proposition. Propositionally speaking, Affirming the Consequent is the logical equivalent of assuming the converse of a statement to be true. The fallacy of affirming the consequent occurs when a hypothetical proposition comprising an antecedent and a consequent asserts that the truthhood of the consequent implies the truthhood of the antecedent. This is fallacious because it assumes a bidirectionality when it does not necessarily exist. ....This logical error is called the fallacy of affirming the consequent because it is mistakenly concluded from the second premise that the affirmation of the consequent entails the truthhood of the antecedent. One way to demonstrate the invalidity is to use a counterexample. Here is an argument that is obviously incorrect: ....However, be aware that a similar argument form is valid in which the first premise asserts "if and only if" rather than "if". Similarly, the converse of a statement can be validly assumed to be true so long as the "if and only if" phrase is attached. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affirming_the_consequent http://www.drury.edu/ess/Logic/Informal/Affirming_the_Consequent.html > > > >All known objects are processes. Consciousness is as much an object as > >other processes that re-present a present moment through changing > >stuff, everything is constantly changing and opposite things are > >identical, so that everything is and is not at the same time. In other > >words, Universal Flux and the Identity of Opposites may entail a > >denial of the Law of Non-Contradiction, since all things go and > >nothing stays, and comparing existents to the flow of a river which > >you cannot step twice into. On those stepping into rivers staying the > >same other and other waters flow. There is an antithesis between > >'same' and 'other,' different waters flow in rivers staying the same, > >though the waters are always changing, the rivers stay the same. > >Indeed, it must be precisely because the waters are always changing > >that there are rivers at all, rather than lakes or ponds. The message > >is that rivers can stay the same over time even though, or indeed > >because, the waters change. The point, then, is not that everything is > >changing, but that the fact that some things change makes possible the > >continued existence of other things. Perhaps more generally, the > >change in elements or constituents supports the constancy of higher- > >level structures. > > Word salad. Try again. Can you point to somewhere where your theory of word salad applies in the above text. It will do no good to just claim something is true or false or this or that without being prepared to provide something to back up your claims with.
From: Immortalist on 16 Jun 2010 20:47 On Jun 15, 8:18 pm, "Tronscend" <tronf...(a)frizurf.no> wrote: > Hi, > > "Immortalista" <extro...(a)hotmail.com> skrev i meldingnews:cb98da81-4358-45a7-a9c5-143f7ff38cd5(a)y18g2000prn.googlegroups.com... > > > One form of materialism is the view that mental states are identical > > with brain states. To have a certain kind of mental state is the same > > thing as having a certain type of brain state. To think a certain sort > > of thought is to have a certain sort of thing happen in the brain. To > > feel pain is to have another sort of thing happen in the brain. To > > wish for good weather is to have another sort of thing happen in the > > brain. This theory is called the mind-brain identity theory. > > It is probably correct (considering the alternatives), but it its probably > not sufficient. I.e., comparing the "mind" to a "tv screen", the TV can show > a lot of different films using only its such and such activated pixels - all > of this is explicable in physics. But no physics can explain why Richard > Burton in Graham Greene's "The Comedians" is jealous of E. Taylor, although > we with absolute empirical certainty see him exhibiting all signs of > jealousy on the tv screen during TCM's late night rerun of the movie. So > there are a lot of levels of theory missing if u consider only the > oscilloscope. There is narratology, too; etc.. > Your confusing the "computational theory of mind" with "computer science" totally different creatures. Cognitive science and much of psychology is now based upon the computational theory of the mind and it has little to do with clunky computers. All this variant of the computational theory of the mind is claiming is that; To have a certain kind of mental state is the same thing as having a certain type of brain state, not some pixels on a screen but a "sufficient group of neural actions to be all and everything of the experience". To think a certain sort of thought is to have a certain sort of thing happen in the brain. To feel pain is to have another sort of thing happen in the brain. I am not sure but you may be substituting a distorted, exaggerated or misrepresented version of my position and simply attacking a distorted version of a position simply does not constitute an attack on the position itself (One might as well expect an attack on a poor drawing of a person to hurt the person). http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/straw-man.html In philosophy, the computational theory of mind is the view that the human mind ought to be conceived as an information processing system and that thought is a form of computation. The theory was proposed in its modern form by Hilary Putnam in 1961[citation needed] and developed by Jerry Fodor in the 60s and 70s.[1] This view is common in modern cognitive psychology and is presumed by theorists of evolutionary psychology. The computational theory of mind is a philosophical concept that the mind functions as a computer or symbol manipulator. The theory is that the mind computes input from the natural world to create outputs in the form of further mental or physical states. A computation is the process of taking input and following a step by step algorithm to get a specific output. The computational theory of mind claims that there are certain aspects of the mind that follow step by step processes to compute representations of the world, however this theory does not claim that computation is sufficient for thought. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind > > > > Persons And Their World: An Introduction to Philosophy - Jeffrey Olen > >http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0075543117/ > > > Mental states are objects, like tables or chairs. > > Perhaps not, if they are instantiations of information being captured by a > physical substrate. The physical substrate being a certain state of > capturing, instantiating or manifesting a certain type, amount or whatever > parameter of information, does not mean that the mental state is an object > like a table. If these instantiations of information are identical to groups of changing neural states you dam betcha they are processes and if tables and chairs are changing atomic processes then both neural changes and other atomic changes are objects. Clue; different groups of processes create stabilities that last long enough for other processes to uses them as concrete objects and components. > A clear case of hylomorphism.... > > They are events, > If a hylomorphism is a recursive function and this is happening in changing states of silicon chips, it is a process. Look man I is making this stuff up, isn't that rare? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism_%28computer_science%29 > > like the kicking of a football. Thinking is a mental state, an object. > > So are wishing and hoping and dreaming objects if objects are just > > events. These are all mental events, things that we do. Therefore > > there are such "objects" as thoughts, wishes, hopes,, or images. > > Category error. > If a category mistake, or category error, is a semantic or ontological error by which a property is ascribed to a thing that could not possibly have that property and I can provide good evidence that a technical explanation of a table is the same as a handshake, it is not a category mistake. If it can be shown that all known objects are processes similar to what we normally call processes, I don't see what your trying to show. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacy_of_composition http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacy_of_division > > What is the difference between an event and an object? No difference > > because all known objects are events based upon interactive processes. > > (Nominalism) An event is a happening, an occurrence. It is what > > objects do, what happens to objects. > > Reread: > 1. "What is the difference between an event and an object? No difference". All known objects are changing relationships of processes that make up their components. > 2. "An event is /.../ what happens to objects". Physics conclusively shows that a table is an "event" and the current state of the table is a step in a long process of the life of the changing table. > If there is no diff between events and objects, how can an event happen to > an object? This is an interaction of processes where some produce boundries by their changing states. They can like changing atoms and particles work in chemistry to become moleules. > This is a trivial response, made possible by the author's unsophisticated > use of concepts. A little common language use phil analysis would go a long > way here. > Can you point to where the use of concepts are unsophisticated and explain why those phrases are unsophisticated? > Take, for example, the event of> kicking a football. If I kick a football, there are only two objects > > involved-me and the ball. > The event of kicking the ball involves changing states of hundreds of body muscles and trillions of atoms changing states in the football not to mention the changing world these events are part of. > + the earth (gravity), air (friction), air II (wind), surface, sunlight (aim > & visibility), technique... etc. ad infinitam. > > There is also the event of my kicking the > > > ball, but that event is not a third object True, we sometimes talk as > > though there were such objects as kicks. We say that someone made a > > good kick, or that a kick saved a game, or that a field-goal kicker > > made five kicks during a game. But that is just a manner of speaking. > > There are no such objects as kicks. > > Confusing "objects" and "realities (things)" as objects in the world > (ontology) and objects, concepts or merely terms, words in language. Does a > concept exist? How, when and where? Welcome to the twentieth century and the revolution physics has brought about. You propositions are wrong because they neglect what physics has shown. If your antique ontology works these days please defend your implication that objects are somehow not just processes changing. > ++++ Max naivete wrt "objects", as if they were simply something to be read > off sensory impressions on account of their being 'pics of 'reality' ". The > object calles a "hand" is slightly more complex than granted in language. > > > Similarly, there are such objects as handshakes. If I shake a friend's > > hand, the objects involved are my hand and my friend's hand. ... > The last part of the original post was edited to say the opposite meaning that the author stated. He like you naively tried to claim that as for objects and processes that you gotta keep em separated. > T
From: Immortalist on 16 Jun 2010 20:49 On Jun 15, 9:57 pm, "Anthony Buckland" <anthonybucklandnos...(a)telus.net> wrote: > "Immortalista" <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote in message > > news:cb98da81-4358-45a7-a9c5-143f7ff38cd5(a)y18g2000prn.googlegroups.com... > > > One form of materialism is the view that mental states are identical > > with brain states. To have a certain kind of mental state is the same > > thing as having a certain type of brain state. To think a certain sort > > of thought is to have a certain sort of thing happen in the brain. To > > feel pain is to have another sort of thing happen in the brain. To > > wish for good weather is to have another sort of thing happen in the > > brain. This theory is called the mind-brain identity theory. > > The brain has a lot more to do than have thoughts. Keeping the > heart beating at appropriate rates is one example. Are you claiming that I implied that the brain is not involved in the regulation of the heart? The topic was thoughts and mental states, do you want me to ad more to the topic or is it ok to focus on some part in relation to the idea of materialism?
From: raven1 on 16 Jun 2010 20:53 On Wed, 16 Jun 2010 17:05:30 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist <reanimater_2000(a)yahoo.com> wrote: >On Jun 15, 7:41�pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 19:12:02 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist >> >> >> >> <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: >> >On Jun 15, 6:55 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: >> >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 17:28:02 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist >> >> >> <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: >> >> >On Jun 15, 5:02 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: >> >> >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 16:24:34 -0700 (PDT), Immortalista >> >> >> >> <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> >One form of materialism is the view that mental states are identical >> >> >> >with brain states. To have a certain kind of mental state is the same >> >> >> >thing as having a certain type of brain state. To think a certain sort >> >> >> >of thought is to have a certain sort of thing happen in the brain. To >> >> >> >feel pain is to have another sort of thing happen in the brain. To >> >> >> >wish for good weather is to have another sort of thing happen in the >> >> >> >brain. This theory is called the mind-brain identity theory. >> >> >> >> >Persons And Their World: An Introduction to Philosophy - Jeffrey Olen >> >> >> >http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0075543117/ >> >> >> >> >Mental states are objects, like tables or chairs. They are events, >> >> >> >like the kicking of a football. Thinking is a mental state, an object. >> >> >> >So are wishing and hoping and dreaming objects if objects are just >> >> >> >events. These are all mental events, things that we do. Therefore >> >> >> >there are such "objects" as thoughts, wishes, hopes,, or images. >> >> >> >> >What is the difference between an event and an object? No difference >> >> >> >because all known objects are events based upon interactive processes. >> >> >> >(Nominalism) An event is a happening, an occurrence. It is what >> >> >> >objects do, what happens to objects. Take, for example, the event of >> >> >> >kicking a football. If I kick a football, there are only two objects >> >> >> >involved-me and the ball. There is also the event of my kicking the >> >> >> >ball, but that event is not a third object True, we sometimes talk as >> >> >> >though there were such objects as kicks. We say that someone made a >> >> >> >good kick, or that a kick saved a game, or that a field-goal kicker >> >> >> >made five kicks during a game. But that is just a manner of speaking. >> >> >> >There are no such objects as kicks. >> >> >> >> >Similarly, there are such objects as handshakes. If I shake a friend's >> >> >> >hand, the objects involved are my hand and my friend's hand. We can >> >> >> >talk as though there were a third thing. We can say, for example, that >> >> >> >I gave my friend a firm handshake, which is really like giving someone >> >> >> >a firm container. To give a firm handshake is to shake hands firmly. >> >> >> >That is, there is only the event of shaking hands, but no such object >> >> >> >as a handshake. Shaking hands is something we do. >> >> >> >> Congratulations. You appear to have discovered the difference between >> >> >> verbs and nouns. Did you have a point? >> >> >> >Can you explain your theory about nouns and verbs and how it applies >> >> >to what I typed? >> >> >> Sorry, what I wrote was incomplete. You also apparently understand >> >> adjectives and adverbs. >> >> >> That said, I'm still at a loss as to what your point was in the first >> >> place. Would you mind explaining just what exactly it is that you're >> >> trying to say? >> >> >I suppose that I was experimenting with the idea that "If all known >> >objects are processes then it may be the case that all known processes >> >are objects." >> >> Stop right there. That sentence makes no sense unless you're using >> your own personal definition of "objects", "processes", or both. >> > >In physics no "atom" or smallest particle has been found which is not >a "process" instead of a thing. The history of the "atomic theory" has >led from intuitive units in the Greeks to subatomic particles >currently to possibly "strings". But as yet all known object including >particle are changing states of fields or smaller particles. Therefore >all known objects are just processes which are interactions of >changing relationships between other processes. > >> >That would be the fallacy of affirming the consequent in >> >logic so I am trying to learn how to argue the position. >> >> It would help if you were to define your terms coherently. >> > >Ha, check that out. You know for the last decade I get complaints to >not define and explain myself so thoroughly. I am the pasting man >because I will flood you with "excellently to the point jizz" > >Affirming the consequent Oh hell, I know what affirming the consequent is. What I don't know is what you mean by "object" or "process" > >Affirming the consequent is a logical fallacy in the form of a >hypothetical proposition. Propositionally speaking, Affirming the >Consequent is the logical equivalent of assuming the converse of a >statement to be true. The fallacy of affirming the consequent occurs >when a hypothetical proposition comprising an antecedent and a >consequent asserts that the truthhood of the consequent implies the >truthhood of the antecedent. This is fallacious because it assumes a >bidirectionality when it does not necessarily exist. > >...This logical error is called the fallacy of affirming the >consequent because it is mistakenly concluded from the second premise >that the affirmation of the consequent entails the truthhood of the >antecedent. One way to demonstrate the invalidity is to use a >counterexample. Here is an argument that is obviously incorrect: > >...However, be aware that a similar argument form is valid in which >the first premise asserts "if and only if" rather than "if". >Similarly, the converse of a statement can be validly assumed to be >true so long as the "if and only if" phrase is attached. > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affirming_the_consequent > >http://www.drury.edu/ess/Logic/Informal/Affirming_the_Consequent.html > >> >> >> >All known objects are processes. Consciousness is as much an object as >> >other processes that re-present a present moment through changing >> >stuff, everything is constantly changing and opposite things are >> >identical, so that everything is and is not at the same time. In other >> >words, Universal Flux and the Identity of Opposites may entail a >> >denial of the Law of Non-Contradiction, since all things go and >> >nothing stays, and comparing existents to the flow of a river which >> >you cannot step twice into. On those stepping into rivers staying the >> >same other and other waters flow. There is an antithesis between >> >'same' and 'other,' different waters flow in rivers staying the same, >> >though the waters are always changing, the rivers stay the same. >> >Indeed, it must be precisely because the waters are always changing >> >that there are rivers at all, rather than lakes or ponds. The message >> >is that rivers can stay the same over time even though, or indeed >> >because, the waters change. The point, then, is not that everything is >> >changing, but that the fact that some things change makes possible the >> >continued existence of other things. Perhaps more generally, the >> >change in elements or constituents supports the constancy of higher- >> >level structures. >> >> Word salad. Try again. > >Can you point to somewhere where your theory of word salad applies in >the above text. It will do no good to just claim something is true or >false I can't determine whether it's true or false, because it's incoherent. I literally have no idea what you're trying to say. >or this or that without being prepared to provide something to >back up your claims with.
From: Darwin123 on 16 Jun 2010 21:57
On Jun 16, 8:53 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: > On Wed, 16 Jun 2010 17:05:30 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist > > > > <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > >On Jun 15, 7:41 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: > >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 19:12:02 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist > > >> <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > >> >On Jun 15, 6:55 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: > >> >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 17:28:02 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist > > >> >> <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > >> >> >On Jun 15, 5:02 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 16:24:34 -0700 (PDT), Immortalista > > >> >> >> <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >One form of materialism is the view that mental states are identical > >> >> >> >with brain states. To have a certain kind of mental state is the same > >> >> >> >thing as having a certain type of brain state. To think a certain sort > >> >> >> >of thought is to have a certain sort of thing happen in the brain. To > >> >> >> >feel pain is to have another sort of thing happen in the brain. To > >> >> >> >wish for good weather is to have another sort of thing happen in the > >> >> >> >brain. This theory is called the mind-brain identity theory. > > >> >> >> >Persons And Their World: An Introduction to Philosophy - Jeffrey Olen > >> >> >> >http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0075543117/ > > >> >> >> >Mental states are objects, like tables or chairs. They are events, > >> >> >> >like the kicking of a football. Thinking is a mental state, an object. > >> >> >> >So are wishing and hoping and dreaming objects if objects are just > >> >> >> >events. These are all mental events, things that we do. Therefore > >> >> >> >there are such "objects" as thoughts, wishes, hopes,, or images.. > > >> >> >> >What is the difference between an event and an object? No difference > >> >> >> >because all known objects are events based upon interactive processes. > >> >> >> >(Nominalism) An event is a happening, an occurrence. It is what > >> >> >> >objects do, what happens to objects. Take, for example, the event of > >> >> >> >kicking a football. If I kick a football, there are only two objects > >> >> >> >involved-me and the ball. There is also the event of my kicking the > >> >> >> >ball, but that event is not a third object True, we sometimes talk as > >> >> >> >though there were such objects as kicks. We say that someone made a > >> >> >> >good kick, or that a kick saved a game, or that a field-goal kicker > >> >> >> >made five kicks during a game. But that is just a manner of speaking. > >> >> >> >There are no such objects as kicks. > > >> >> >> >Similarly, there are such objects as handshakes. If I shake a friend's > >> >> >> >hand, the objects involved are my hand and my friend's hand. We can > >> >> >> >talk as though there were a third thing. We can say, for example, that > >> >> >> >I gave my friend a firm handshake, which is really like giving someone > >> >> >> >a firm container. To give a firm handshake is to shake hands firmly. > >> >> >> >That is, there is only the event of shaking hands, but no such object > >> >> >> >as a handshake. Shaking hands is something we do. > > >> >> >> Congratulations. You appear to have discovered the difference between > >> >> >> verbs and nouns. Did you have a point? > > >> >> >Can you explain your theory about nouns and verbs and how it applies > >> >> >to what I typed? > > >> >> Sorry, what I wrote was incomplete. You also apparently understand > >> >> adjectives and adverbs. > > >> >> That said, I'm still at a loss as to what your point was in the first > >> >> place. Would you mind explaining just what exactly it is that you're > >> >> trying to say? > > >> >I suppose that I was experimenting with the idea that "If all known > >> >objects are processes then it may be the case that all known processes > >> >are objects." > > >> Stop right there. That sentence makes no sense unless you're using > >> your own personal definition of "objects", "processes", or both. > > >In physics no "atom" or smallest particle has been found which is not > >a "process" instead of a thing. The history of the "atomic theory" has > >led from intuitive units in the Greeks to subatomic particles > >currently to possibly "strings". But as yet all known object including > >particle are changing states of fields or smaller particles. Therefore > >all known objects are just processes which are interactions of > >changing relationships between other processes. > > >> >That would be the fallacy of affirming the consequent in > >> >logic so I am trying to learn how to argue the position. > > >> It would help if you were to define your terms coherently. > > >Ha, check that out. You know for the last decade I get complaints to > >not define and explain myself so thoroughly. I am the pasting man > >because I will flood you with "excellently to the point jizz" > > >Affirming the consequent > > Oh hell, I know what affirming the consequent is. What I don't know is > what you mean by "object" or "process" > > > > > > >Affirming the consequent is a logical fallacy in the form of a > >hypothetical proposition. Propositionally speaking, Affirming the > >Consequent is the logical equivalent of assuming the converse of a > >statement to be true. The fallacy of affirming the consequent occurs > >when a hypothetical proposition comprising an antecedent and a > >consequent asserts that the truthhood of the consequent implies the > >truthhood of the antecedent. This is fallacious because it assumes a > >bidirectionality when it does not necessarily exist. > > >...This logical error is called the fallacy of affirming the > >consequent because it is mistakenly concluded from the second premise > >that the affirmation of the consequent entails the truthhood of the > >antecedent. One way to demonstrate the invalidity is to use a > >counterexample. Here is an argument that is obviously incorrect: > > >...However, be aware that a similar argument form is valid in which > >the first premise asserts "if and only if" rather than "if". > >Similarly, the converse of a statement can be validly assumed to be > >true so long as the "if and only if" phrase is attached. > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affirming_the_consequent > > >http://www.drury.edu/ess/Logic/Informal/Affirming_the_Consequent.html > > >> >All known objects are processes. Consciousness is as much an object as > >> >other processes that re-present a present moment through changing > >> >stuff, everything is constantly changing and opposite things are > >> >identical, so that everything is and is not at the same time. In other > >> >words, Universal Flux and the Identity of Opposites may entail a > >> >denial of the Law of Non-Contradiction, since all things go and > >> >nothing stays, and comparing existents to the flow of a river which > >> >you cannot step twice into. On those stepping into rivers staying the > >> >same other and other waters flow. There is an antithesis between > >> >'same' and 'other,' different waters flow in rivers staying the same, > >> >though the waters are always changing, the rivers stay the same. > >> >Indeed, it must be precisely because the waters are always changing > >> >that there are rivers at all, rather than lakes or ponds. The message > >> >is that rivers can stay the same over time even though, or indeed > >> >because, the waters change. The point, then, is not that everything is > >> >changing, but that the fact that some things change makes possible the > >> >continued existence of other things. Perhaps more generally, the > >> >change in elements or constituents supports the constancy of higher- > >> >level structures. > > >> Word salad. Try again. > > >Can you point to somewhere where your theory of word salad applies in > >the above text. It will do no good to just claim something is true or > >false > > I can't determine whether it's true or false, because it's incoherent. > I literally have no idea what you're trying to say. > > >or this or that without being prepared to provide something to > >back up your claims with. > > I am sorry to say that you made several mistakes while replying to Immortalista. You were wrong when you said he understands the difference between nouns and pronouns. You made an additional mistake when you said he understood the difference between adjectives and adverbs. You also made a mistake when asking him to back up his claim. He made no claims, nor is he coherent enough to make one. His post contained no conceptual framework. There was no thought, no meaning. He could not make a mistake because nothing he said connected with the physical universe. Therefore, all the errors in your conversation were yours. One can't correct random noise. |