Thoughts are objects, mind and brain are identical
in [Physics]
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From: raven1 on 17 Jun 2010 09:01 On Wed, 16 Jun 2010 18:57:06 -0700 (PDT), Darwin123 <drosen0000(a)yahoo.com> wrote: >On Jun 16, 8:53�pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: >> On Wed, 16 Jun 2010 17:05:30 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist >> >> >> >> <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: >> >On Jun 15, 7:41 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: >> >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 19:12:02 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist >> >> >> <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: >> >> >On Jun 15, 6:55 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: >> >> >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 17:28:02 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist >> >> >> >> <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: >> >> >> >On Jun 15, 5:02 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 16:24:34 -0700 (PDT), Immortalista >> >> >> >> >> <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >One form of materialism is the view that mental states are identical >> >> >> >> >with brain states. To have a certain kind of mental state is the same >> >> >> >> >thing as having a certain type of brain state. To think a certain sort >> >> >> >> >of thought is to have a certain sort of thing happen in the brain. To >> >> >> >> >feel pain is to have another sort of thing happen in the brain. To >> >> >> >> >wish for good weather is to have another sort of thing happen in the >> >> >> >> >brain. This theory is called the mind-brain identity theory. >> >> >> >> >> >Persons And Their World: An Introduction to Philosophy - Jeffrey Olen >> >> >> >> >http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0075543117/ >> >> >> >> >> >Mental states are objects, like tables or chairs. They are events, >> >> >> >> >like the kicking of a football. Thinking is a mental state, an object. >> >> >> >> >So are wishing and hoping and dreaming objects if objects are just >> >> >> >> >events. These are all mental events, things that we do. Therefore >> >> >> >> >there are such "objects" as thoughts, wishes, hopes,, or images. >> >> >> >> >> >What is the difference between an event and an object? No difference >> >> >> >> >because all known objects are events based upon interactive processes. >> >> >> >> >(Nominalism) An event is a happening, an occurrence. It is what >> >> >> >> >objects do, what happens to objects. Take, for example, the event of >> >> >> >> >kicking a football. If I kick a football, there are only two objects >> >> >> >> >involved-me and the ball. There is also the event of my kicking the >> >> >> >> >ball, but that event is not a third object True, we sometimes talk as >> >> >> >> >though there were such objects as kicks. We say that someone made a >> >> >> >> >good kick, or that a kick saved a game, or that a field-goal kicker >> >> >> >> >made five kicks during a game. But that is just a manner of speaking. >> >> >> >> >There are no such objects as kicks. >> >> >> >> >> >Similarly, there are such objects as handshakes. If I shake a friend's >> >> >> >> >hand, the objects involved are my hand and my friend's hand. We can >> >> >> >> >talk as though there were a third thing. We can say, for example, that >> >> >> >> >I gave my friend a firm handshake, which is really like giving someone >> >> >> >> >a firm container. To give a firm handshake is to shake hands firmly. >> >> >> >> >That is, there is only the event of shaking hands, but no such object >> >> >> >> >as a handshake. Shaking hands is something we do. >> >> >> >> >> Congratulations. You appear to have discovered the difference between >> >> >> >> verbs and nouns. Did you have a point? >> >> >> >> >Can you explain your theory about nouns and verbs and how it applies >> >> >> >to what I typed? >> >> >> >> Sorry, what I wrote was incomplete. You also apparently understand >> >> >> adjectives and adverbs. >> >> >> >> That said, I'm still at a loss as to what your point was in the first >> >> >> place. Would you mind explaining just what exactly it is that you're >> >> >> trying to say? >> >> >> >I suppose that I was experimenting with the idea that "If all known >> >> >objects are processes then it may be the case that all known processes >> >> >are objects." >> >> >> Stop right there. That sentence makes no sense unless you're using >> >> your own personal definition of "objects", "processes", or both. >> >> >In physics no "atom" or smallest particle has been found which is not >> >a "process" instead of a thing. The history of the "atomic theory" has >> >led from intuitive units in the Greeks to subatomic particles >> >currently to possibly "strings". But as yet all known object including >> >particle are changing states of fields or smaller particles. Therefore >> >all known objects are just processes which are interactions of >> >changing relationships between other processes. >> >> >> >That would be the fallacy of affirming the consequent in >> >> >logic so I am trying to learn how to argue the position. >> >> >> It would help if you were to define your terms coherently. >> >> >Ha, check that out. You know for the last decade I get complaints to >> >not define and explain myself so thoroughly. I am the pasting man >> >because I will flood you with "excellently to the point jizz" >> >> >Affirming the consequent >> >> Oh hell, I know what affirming the consequent is. What I don't know is >> what you mean by "object" or "process" >> >> >> >> >> >> >Affirming the consequent is a logical fallacy in the form of a >> >hypothetical proposition. Propositionally speaking, Affirming the >> >Consequent is the logical equivalent of assuming the converse of a >> >statement to be true. The fallacy of affirming the consequent occurs >> >when a hypothetical proposition comprising an antecedent and a >> >consequent asserts that the truthhood of the consequent implies the >> >truthhood of the antecedent. This is fallacious because it assumes a >> >bidirectionality when it does not necessarily exist. >> >> >...This logical error is called the fallacy of affirming the >> >consequent because it is mistakenly concluded from the second premise >> >that the affirmation of the consequent entails the truthhood of the >> >antecedent. One way to demonstrate the invalidity is to use a >> >counterexample. Here is an argument that is obviously incorrect: >> >> >...However, be aware that a similar argument form is valid in which >> >the first premise asserts "if and only if" rather than "if". >> >Similarly, the converse of a statement can be validly assumed to be >> >true so long as the "if and only if" phrase is attached. >> >> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affirming_the_consequent >> >> >http://www.drury.edu/ess/Logic/Informal/Affirming_the_Consequent.html >> >> >> >All known objects are processes. Consciousness is as much an object as >> >> >other processes that re-present a present moment through changing >> >> >stuff, everything is constantly changing and opposite things are >> >> >identical, so that everything is and is not at the same time. In other >> >> >words, Universal Flux and the Identity of Opposites may entail a >> >> >denial of the Law of Non-Contradiction, since all things go and >> >> >nothing stays, and comparing existents to the flow of a river which >> >> >you cannot step twice into. On those stepping into rivers staying the >> >> >same other and other waters flow. There is an antithesis between >> >> >'same' and 'other,' different waters flow in rivers staying the same, >> >> >though the waters are always changing, the rivers stay the same. >> >> >Indeed, it must be precisely because the waters are always changing >> >> >that there are rivers at all, rather than lakes or ponds. The message >> >> >is that rivers can stay the same over time even though, or indeed >> >> >because, the waters change. The point, then, is not that everything is >> >> >changing, but that the fact that some things change makes possible the >> >> >continued existence of other things. Perhaps more generally, the >> >> >change in elements or constituents supports the constancy of higher- >> >> >level structures. >> >> >> Word salad. Try again. >> >> >Can you point to somewhere where your theory of word salad applies in >> >the above text. It will do no good to just claim something is true or >> >false >> >> I can't determine whether it's true or false, because it's incoherent. >> I literally have no idea what you're trying to say. >> >> >or this or that without being prepared to provide something to >> >back up your claims with. >> >> > I am sorry to say that you made several mistakes while replying >to Immortalista. > You were wrong when you said he understands the difference >between nouns and pronouns. You made an additional mistake when you >said he understood the difference between adjectives and adverbs. > You also made a mistake when asking him to back up his claim. He >made no claims, nor is he coherent enough to make one. > His post contained no conceptual framework. There was no thought, >no meaning. He could not make a mistake because nothing he said >connected with the physical universe. Therefore, all the errors in >your conversation were yours. One can't correct random noise. Mea culpa.
From: Immortalist on 17 Jun 2010 20:30 On Jun 16, 5:53 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: > On Wed, 16 Jun 2010 17:05:30 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist > > > > <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > >On Jun 15, 7:41 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: > >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 19:12:02 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist > > >> <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > >> >On Jun 15, 6:55 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: > >> >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 17:28:02 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist > > >> >> <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > >> >> >On Jun 15, 5:02 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 16:24:34 -0700 (PDT), Immortalista > > >> >> >> <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >One form of materialism is the view that mental states are identical > >> >> >> >with brain states. To have a certain kind of mental state is the same > >> >> >> >thing as having a certain type of brain state. To think a certain sort > >> >> >> >of thought is to have a certain sort of thing happen in the brain. To > >> >> >> >feel pain is to have another sort of thing happen in the brain. To > >> >> >> >wish for good weather is to have another sort of thing happen in the > >> >> >> >brain. This theory is called the mind-brain identity theory. > > >> >> >> >Persons And Their World: An Introduction to Philosophy - Jeffrey Olen > >> >> >> >http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0075543117/ > > >> >> >> >Mental states are objects, like tables or chairs. They are events, > >> >> >> >like the kicking of a football. Thinking is a mental state, an object. > >> >> >> >So are wishing and hoping and dreaming objects if objects are just > >> >> >> >events. These are all mental events, things that we do. Therefore > >> >> >> >there are such "objects" as thoughts, wishes, hopes,, or images.. > > >> >> >> >What is the difference between an event and an object? No difference > >> >> >> >because all known objects are events based upon interactive processes. > >> >> >> >(Nominalism) An event is a happening, an occurrence. It is what > >> >> >> >objects do, what happens to objects. Take, for example, the event of > >> >> >> >kicking a football. If I kick a football, there are only two objects > >> >> >> >involved-me and the ball. There is also the event of my kicking the > >> >> >> >ball, but that event is not a third object True, we sometimes talk as > >> >> >> >though there were such objects as kicks. We say that someone made a > >> >> >> >good kick, or that a kick saved a game, or that a field-goal kicker > >> >> >> >made five kicks during a game. But that is just a manner of speaking. > >> >> >> >There are no such objects as kicks. > > >> >> >> >Similarly, there are such objects as handshakes. If I shake a friend's > >> >> >> >hand, the objects involved are my hand and my friend's hand. We can > >> >> >> >talk as though there were a third thing. We can say, for example, that > >> >> >> >I gave my friend a firm handshake, which is really like giving someone > >> >> >> >a firm container. To give a firm handshake is to shake hands firmly. > >> >> >> >That is, there is only the event of shaking hands, but no such object > >> >> >> >as a handshake. Shaking hands is something we do. > > >> >> >> Congratulations. You appear to have discovered the difference between > >> >> >> verbs and nouns. Did you have a point? > > >> >> >Can you explain your theory about nouns and verbs and how it applies > >> >> >to what I typed? > > >> >> Sorry, what I wrote was incomplete. You also apparently understand > >> >> adjectives and adverbs. > > >> >> That said, I'm still at a loss as to what your point was in the first > >> >> place. Would you mind explaining just what exactly it is that you're > >> >> trying to say? > > >> >I suppose that I was experimenting with the idea that "If all known > >> >objects are processes then it may be the case that all known processes > >> >are objects." > > >> Stop right there. That sentence makes no sense unless you're using > >> your own personal definition of "objects", "processes", or both. > > >In physics no "atom" or smallest particle has been found which is not > >a "process" instead of a thing. The history of the "atomic theory" has > >led from intuitive units in the Greeks to subatomic particles > >currently to possibly "strings". But as yet all known object including > >particle are changing states of fields or smaller particles. Therefore > >all known objects are just processes which are interactions of > >changing relationships between other processes. > > >> >That would be the fallacy of affirming the consequent in > >> >logic so I am trying to learn how to argue the position. > > >> It would help if you were to define your terms coherently. > > >Ha, check that out. You know for the last decade I get complaints to > >not define and explain myself so thoroughly. I am the pasting man > >because I will flood you with "excellently to the point jizz" > > >Affirming the consequent > > Oh hell, I know what affirming the consequent is. What I don't know is > what you mean by "object" or "process" > I meant a "physical object" which might be defined as; a tangible and visible entity; an entity that can cast a shadow; "it was full of rackets, balls and other objects" http://www.google.com/search?q=define%3Aobject process 1 course of action or proceeding, esp. a series of stages in manufacture etc. 2 progress or course (in process of construction). 3 natural or involuntary course or change (process of growing old). 4 action at law; summons or writ. 5 natural projection of a bone, stem, etc. v. 1 deal with by a particular process. 2 (as processed adj.) treat (food, esp. to prevent decay) (processed cheese). [[Latin: related to proceed]] Now in formal branch of philosophy called; "process philosophy" the definition is a little different; here is a relatively short definition; Process Philosophy The doctrine that either what is is becoming, or that what is ultimately consists in change, or both. A process is a sequence of changes. Strong and weak process philosophy may be usefully distinguished. On the weak version, x changes if and only if either x is F at a time, t1, and x is not F at a later time, t2, or x is not F at t1 and x is F at t2; so something's changing consists in its gaining or losing at least one property. It is sometimes maintained (with dubious coherence) that each thing is always changing in every respect. On the strong version, there are only changes or, at least, the existence of enduring items logically depends upon changes such that it is ontologically misleading to speak of what is or things that are. One locus classicus of strong process philosophy is Plato's Theaetetus, where the thesis is ascribed by Socrates to Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles; another is Heraclitus' Cosmic Fragments. More recently, 'process philosophy' has been used as a name for the event ontologies of James, Bergson, and Whitehead (notably, in his Process and Reality). It should also be extended to Russell's neutral monist doctrine that minds and physical objects are logical constructions out of events. The existence of change, which is logically entailed by the existence of process, has been denied by Parmenides in his Poem, by F. H. Bradley in Appearance and Reality, and by J. M. E. McTaggart in The Nature of Existence. If some of the arguments of these philosophers are sound then there really is no change and a fortiori no true process philosophy. However, at least prima facie, change is a pervasive feature of what is, and many things that are may be described without contradiction as processes. http://www.drury.edu/multinl/story.cfm?ID=2528&NLID=166 > > > > > >Affirming the consequent is a logical fallacy in the form of a > >hypothetical proposition. Propositionally speaking, Affirming the > >Consequent is the logical equivalent of assuming the converse of a > >statement to be true. The fallacy of affirming the consequent occurs > >when a hypothetical proposition comprising an antecedent and a > >consequent asserts that the truthhood of the consequent implies the > >truthhood of the antecedent. This is fallacious because it assumes a > >bidirectionality when it does not necessarily exist. > > >...This logical error is called the fallacy of affirming the > >consequent because it is mistakenly concluded from the second premise > >that the affirmation of the consequent entails the truthhood of the > >antecedent. One way to demonstrate the invalidity is to use a > >counterexample. Here is an argument that is obviously incorrect: > > >...However, be aware that a similar argument form is valid in which > >the first premise asserts "if and only if" rather than "if". > >Similarly, the converse of a statement can be validly assumed to be > >true so long as the "if and only if" phrase is attached. > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affirming_the_consequent > > >http://www.drury.edu/ess/Logic/Informal/Affirming_the_Consequent.html > > >> >All known objects are processes. Consciousness is as much an object as > >> >other processes that re-present a present moment through changing > >> >stuff, everything is constantly changing and opposite things are > >> >identical, so that everything is and is not at the same time. In other > >> >words, Universal Flux and the Identity of Opposites may entail a > >> >denial of the Law of Non-Contradiction, since all things go and > >> >nothing stays, and comparing existents to the flow of a river which > >> >you cannot step twice into. On those stepping into rivers staying the > >> >same other and other waters flow. There is an antithesis between > >> >'same' and 'other,' different waters flow in rivers staying the same, > >> >though the waters are always changing, the rivers stay the same. > >> >Indeed, it must be precisely because the waters are always changing > >> >that there are rivers at all, rather than lakes or ponds. The message > >> >is that rivers can stay the same over time even though, or indeed > >> >because, the waters change. The point, then, is not that everything is > >> >changing, but that the fact that some things change makes possible the > >> >continued existence of other things. Perhaps more generally, the > >> >change in elements or constituents supports the constancy of higher- > >> >level structures. > > >> Word salad. Try again. > > >Can you point to somewhere where your theory of word salad applies in > >the above text. It will do no good to just claim something is true or > >false > > I can't determine whether it's true or false, because it's incoherent. > I literally have no idea what you're trying to say. > Then your demanding a traditional usage of the term object and I am not using it that way. What might help is if you chant; "if objects are processes then..." More importantly can you point to where it begins to not make sense? I am sure that at least a part of the first phrase makes sense, is that where your mind drops out after that? Do you have a hard time getting the punchlines of jokes? > >or this or that without being prepared to provide something to > >back up your claims with.
From: Immortalist on 17 Jun 2010 20:37 On Jun 17, 6:01 am, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: > On Wed, 16 Jun 2010 18:57:06 -0700 (PDT), Darwin123 > > > > <drosen0...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > >On Jun 16, 8:53 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: > >> On Wed, 16 Jun 2010 17:05:30 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist > > >> <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > >> >On Jun 15, 7:41 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: > >> >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 19:12:02 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist > > >> >> <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > >> >> >On Jun 15, 6:55 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 17:28:02 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist > > >> >> >> <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >On Jun 15, 5:02 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 16:24:34 -0700 (PDT), Immortalista > > >> >> >> >> <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >One form of materialism is the view that mental states are identical > >> >> >> >> >with brain states. To have a certain kind of mental state is the same > >> >> >> >> >thing as having a certain type of brain state. To think a certain sort > >> >> >> >> >of thought is to have a certain sort of thing happen in the brain. To > >> >> >> >> >feel pain is to have another sort of thing happen in the brain. To > >> >> >> >> >wish for good weather is to have another sort of thing happen in the > >> >> >> >> >brain. This theory is called the mind-brain identity theory. > > >> >> >> >> >Persons And Their World: An Introduction to Philosophy - Jeffrey Olen > >> >> >> >> >http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0075543117/ > > >> >> >> >> >Mental states are objects, like tables or chairs. They are events, > >> >> >> >> >like the kicking of a football. Thinking is a mental state, an object. > >> >> >> >> >So are wishing and hoping and dreaming objects if objects are just > >> >> >> >> >events. These are all mental events, things that we do. Therefore > >> >> >> >> >there are such "objects" as thoughts, wishes, hopes,, or images. > > >> >> >> >> >What is the difference between an event and an object? No difference > >> >> >> >> >because all known objects are events based upon interactive processes. > >> >> >> >> >(Nominalism) An event is a happening, an occurrence. It is what > >> >> >> >> >objects do, what happens to objects. Take, for example, the event of > >> >> >> >> >kicking a football. If I kick a football, there are only two objects > >> >> >> >> >involved-me and the ball. There is also the event of my kicking the > >> >> >> >> >ball, but that event is not a third object True, we sometimes talk as > >> >> >> >> >though there were such objects as kicks. We say that someone made a > >> >> >> >> >good kick, or that a kick saved a game, or that a field-goal kicker > >> >> >> >> >made five kicks during a game. But that is just a manner of speaking. > >> >> >> >> >There are no such objects as kicks. > > >> >> >> >> >Similarly, there are such objects as handshakes. If I shake a friend's > >> >> >> >> >hand, the objects involved are my hand and my friend's hand. We can > >> >> >> >> >talk as though there were a third thing. We can say, for example, that > >> >> >> >> >I gave my friend a firm handshake, which is really like giving someone > >> >> >> >> >a firm container. To give a firm handshake is to shake hands firmly. > >> >> >> >> >That is, there is only the event of shaking hands, but no such object > >> >> >> >> >as a handshake. Shaking hands is something we do. > > >> >> >> >> Congratulations. You appear to have discovered the difference between > >> >> >> >> verbs and nouns. Did you have a point? > > >> >> >> >Can you explain your theory about nouns and verbs and how it applies > >> >> >> >to what I typed? > > >> >> >> Sorry, what I wrote was incomplete. You also apparently understand > >> >> >> adjectives and adverbs. > > >> >> >> That said, I'm still at a loss as to what your point was in the first > >> >> >> place. Would you mind explaining just what exactly it is that you're > >> >> >> trying to say? > > >> >> >I suppose that I was experimenting with the idea that "If all known > >> >> >objects are processes then it may be the case that all known processes > >> >> >are objects." > > >> >> Stop right there. That sentence makes no sense unless you're using > >> >> your own personal definition of "objects", "processes", or both. > > >> >In physics no "atom" or smallest particle has been found which is not > >> >a "process" instead of a thing. The history of the "atomic theory" has > >> >led from intuitive units in the Greeks to subatomic particles > >> >currently to possibly "strings". But as yet all known object including > >> >particle are changing states of fields or smaller particles. Therefore > >> >all known objects are just processes which are interactions of > >> >changing relationships between other processes. > > >> >> >That would be the fallacy of affirming the consequent in > >> >> >logic so I am trying to learn how to argue the position. > > >> >> It would help if you were to define your terms coherently. > > >> >Ha, check that out. You know for the last decade I get complaints to > >> >not define and explain myself so thoroughly. I am the pasting man > >> >because I will flood you with "excellently to the point jizz" > > >> >Affirming the consequent > > >> Oh hell, I know what affirming the consequent is. What I don't know is > >> what you mean by "object" or "process" > > >> >Affirming the consequent is a logical fallacy in the form of a > >> >hypothetical proposition. Propositionally speaking, Affirming the > >> >Consequent is the logical equivalent of assuming the converse of a > >> >statement to be true. The fallacy of affirming the consequent occurs > >> >when a hypothetical proposition comprising an antecedent and a > >> >consequent asserts that the truthhood of the consequent implies the > >> >truthhood of the antecedent. This is fallacious because it assumes a > >> >bidirectionality when it does not necessarily exist. > > >> >...This logical error is called the fallacy of affirming the > >> >consequent because it is mistakenly concluded from the second premise > >> >that the affirmation of the consequent entails the truthhood of the > >> >antecedent. One way to demonstrate the invalidity is to use a > >> >counterexample. Here is an argument that is obviously incorrect: > > >> >...However, be aware that a similar argument form is valid in which > >> >the first premise asserts "if and only if" rather than "if". > >> >Similarly, the converse of a statement can be validly assumed to be > >> >true so long as the "if and only if" phrase is attached. > > >> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affirming_the_consequent > > >> >http://www.drury.edu/ess/Logic/Informal/Affirming_the_Consequent.html > > >> >> >All known objects are processes. Consciousness is as much an object as > >> >> >other processes that re-present a present moment through changing > >> >> >stuff, everything is constantly changing and opposite things are > >> >> >identical, so that everything is and is not at the same time. In other > >> >> >words, Universal Flux and the Identity of Opposites may entail a > >> >> >denial of the Law of Non-Contradiction, since all things go and > >> >> >nothing stays, and comparing existents to the flow of a river which > >> >> >you cannot step twice into. On those stepping into rivers staying the > >> >> >same other and other waters flow. There is an antithesis between > >> >> >'same' and 'other,' different waters flow in rivers staying the same, > >> >> >though the waters are always changing, the rivers stay the same. > >> >> >Indeed, it must be precisely because the waters are always changing > >> >> >that there are rivers at all, rather than lakes or ponds. The message > >> >> >is that rivers can stay the same over time even though, or indeed > >> >> >because, the waters change. The point, then, is not that everything is > >> >> >changing, but that the fact that some things change makes possible the > >> >> >continued existence of other things. Perhaps more generally, the > >> >> >change in elements or constituents supports the constancy of higher- > >> >> >level structures. > > >> >> Word salad. Try again. > > >> >Can you point to somewhere where your theory of word salad applies in > >> >the above text. It will do no good to just claim something is true or > >> >false > > >> I can't determine whether it's true or false, because it's incoherent. > >> I literally have no idea what you're trying to say. > > >> >or this or that without being prepared to provide something to > >> >back up your claims with. > > > I am sorry to say that you made several mistakes while replying > >to Immortalista. > > You were wrong when you said he understands the difference > >between nouns and pronouns. You made an additional mistake when you > >said he understood the difference between adjectives and adverbs. > > You also made a mistake when asking him to back up his claim. He > >made no claims, nor is he coherent enough to make one. > > His post contained no conceptual framework. There was no thought, > >no meaning. He could not make a mistake because nothing he said > >connected with the physical universe. Therefore, all the errors in > >your conversation were yours. One can't correct random noise. > > Mea culpa. Another attempt to fake a response. You haven't established anything you set out to and then when some ignoramus shouts in the gallery you jump for joy like a little girl. Here, you must be like one of them simple minded christian republicans who especially respond to one sided arguments; One-Sided versus Two-Sided Arguments. Suppose you are about to make a speech attempting to persuade your audience that capital punishment is necessary. Would you persuade more people if you simply stated your view and ignored the arguments against capital punishment, or would you be more persuasive if you discussed the opposing arguments and attempted to refute them? Before trying to answer this question, let us try to understand what is involved. If a communicator mentions the opposition's arguments, it might indicate that he or she is an objective, fair-minded person; this could enhance the speaker's trustworthiness and thus increase his or her effectiveness. On the other hand, if a communicator so much as mentions the arguments on the other side of the issue, it might suggest to the audience that the issue is controversial; this could confuse members of the audience, make them vacillate, and ultimately reduce the persuasiveness of the communication. With these possibilities in mind, it should not come as a surprise to the reader that there is no simple relation between one- sided arguments and the effectiveness of the communication. It depends to some extent upon how well informed the audience is: The more well informed the members of the audience are, the less likely they are to be persuaded by a one-sided argument and the more likely they are to be persuaded by an argument that brings out the important opposing arguments and then proceeds to refute them. This makes sense: A well- informed person is more likely to know some of the counterarguments. When the communicator avoids mentioning these, the knowledgeable members of the audience are likely to conclude that the communicator is either unfair or unable to refute such arguments. On the other hand, an uninformed person is less apt to know of the existence of opposing arguments. If the counterargument is ignored, the less- informed members of the audience are persuaded; if the counterargument is presented, they may get confused. The Social Animal - Elliot Aronson - 8th Edition 1999 http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0716733129/ http://groups.google.com/group/talk.philosophy.misc/msg/7c68475bf8112a8d
From: chibiabos on 17 Jun 2010 22:08 In article <cd3050b7-d36c-41b0-bfb6-34937c68ef40(a)s6g2000prg.googlegroups.com>, Immortalist <reanimater_2000(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > On Jun 15, 6:45�pm, chibiabos <c...(a)nospam.com> wrote: > > In article > > <cb98da81-4358-45a7-a9c5-143f7ff38...(a)y18g2000prn.googlegroups.com>, > > > > > > > > Immortalista <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > > > One form of materialism is the view that mental states are identical > > > with brain states. To have a certain kind of mental state is the same > > > thing as having a certain type of brain state. To think a certain sort > > > of thought is to have a certain sort of thing happen in the brain. To > > > feel pain is to have another sort of thing happen in the brain. To > > > wish for good weather is to have another sort of thing happen in the > > > brain. This theory is called the mind-brain identity theory. > > > > > Persons And Their World: An Introduction to Philosophy - Jeffrey Olen > > >http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0075543117/ > > > > > Mental states are objects, like tables or chairs. They are events, > > > like the kicking of a football. Thinking is a mental state, an object. > > > So are wishing and hoping and dreaming objects if objects are just > > > events. These are all mental events, things that we do. Therefore > > > there are such "objects" as thoughts, wishes, hopes,, or images. > > > > > What is the difference between an event and an object? No difference > > > because all known objects are events based upon interactive processes. > > > (Nominalism) An event is a happening, an occurrence. It is what > > > objects do, what happens to objects. Take, for example, the event of > > > kicking a football. If I kick a football, there are only two objects > > > involved-me and the ball. There is also the event of my kicking the > > > ball, but that event is not a third object True, we sometimes talk as > > > though there were such objects as kicks. We say that someone made a > > > good kick, or that a kick saved a game, or that a field-goal kicker > > > made five kicks during a game. But that is just a manner of speaking. > > > There are no such objects as kicks. > > > > > Similarly, there are such objects as handshakes. If I shake a friend's > > > hand, the objects involved are my hand and my friend's hand. We can > > > talk as though there were a third thing. We can say, for example, that > > > I gave my friend a firm handshake, which is really like giving someone > > > a firm container. To give a firm handshake is to shake hands firmly. > > > That is, there is only the event of shaking hands, but no such object > > > as a handshake. Shaking hands is something we do. > > > > Fritz Perls much? > > > > No, but I pay a lot attention to Evolutionary Psychology and ways to > philosophize about it. > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionary_psychology What you do is not philosophy. It is cerebral flatulence. -chib -- Member of S.M.A.S.H. Sarcastic Middle-aged Atheists with a Sense of Humor
From: raven1 on 18 Jun 2010 09:12
On Thu, 17 Jun 2010 17:30:55 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist <reanimater_2000(a)yahoo.com> wrote: >On Jun 16, 5:53�pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: >> On Wed, 16 Jun 2010 17:05:30 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist >> >> >> >> <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: >> >On Jun 15, 7:41�pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: >> >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 19:12:02 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist >> >> >> <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: >> >> >On Jun 15, 6:55 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: >> >> >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 17:28:02 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist >> >> >> >> <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: >> >> >> >On Jun 15, 5:02 pm, raven1 <quoththera...(a)nevermore.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tue, 15 Jun 2010 16:24:34 -0700 (PDT), Immortalista >> >> >> >> >> <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >One form of materialism is the view that mental states are identical >> >> >> >> >with brain states. To have a certain kind of mental state is the same >> >> >> >> >thing as having a certain type of brain state. To think a certain sort >> >> >> >> >of thought is to have a certain sort of thing happen in the brain. To >> >> >> >> >feel pain is to have another sort of thing happen in the brain. To >> >> >> >> >wish for good weather is to have another sort of thing happen in the >> >> >> >> >brain. This theory is called the mind-brain identity theory. >> >> >> >> >> >Persons And Their World: An Introduction to Philosophy - Jeffrey Olen >> >> >> >> >http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0075543117/ >> >> >> >> >> >Mental states are objects, like tables or chairs. They are events, >> >> >> >> >like the kicking of a football. Thinking is a mental state, an object. >> >> >> >> >So are wishing and hoping and dreaming objects if objects are just >> >> >> >> >events. These are all mental events, things that we do. Therefore >> >> >> >> >there are such "objects" as thoughts, wishes, hopes,, or images. >> >> >> >> >> >What is the difference between an event and an object? No difference >> >> >> >> >because all known objects are events based upon interactive processes. >> >> >> >> >(Nominalism) An event is a happening, an occurrence. It is what >> >> >> >> >objects do, what happens to objects. Take, for example, the event of >> >> >> >> >kicking a football. If I kick a football, there are only two objects >> >> >> >> >involved-me and the ball. There is also the event of my kicking the >> >> >> >> >ball, but that event is not a third object True, we sometimes talk as >> >> >> >> >though there were such objects as kicks. We say that someone made a >> >> >> >> >good kick, or that a kick saved a game, or that a field-goal kicker >> >> >> >> >made five kicks during a game. But that is just a manner of speaking. >> >> >> >> >There are no such objects as kicks. >> >> >> >> >> >Similarly, there are such objects as handshakes. If I shake a friend's >> >> >> >> >hand, the objects involved are my hand and my friend's hand. We can >> >> >> >> >talk as though there were a third thing. We can say, for example, that >> >> >> >> >I gave my friend a firm handshake, which is really like giving someone >> >> >> >> >a firm container. To give a firm handshake is to shake hands firmly. >> >> >> >> >That is, there is only the event of shaking hands, but no such object >> >> >> >> >as a handshake. Shaking hands is something we do. >> >> >> >> >> Congratulations. You appear to have discovered the difference between >> >> >> >> verbs and nouns. Did you have a point? >> >> >> >> >Can you explain your theory about nouns and verbs and how it applies >> >> >> >to what I typed? >> >> >> >> Sorry, what I wrote was incomplete. You also apparently understand >> >> >> adjectives and adverbs. >> >> >> >> That said, I'm still at a loss as to what your point was in the first >> >> >> place. Would you mind explaining just what exactly it is that you're >> >> >> trying to say? >> >> >> >I suppose that I was experimenting with the idea that "If all known >> >> >objects are processes then it may be the case that all known processes >> >> >are objects." >> >> >> Stop right there. That sentence makes no sense unless you're using >> >> your own personal definition of "objects", "processes", or both. >> >> >In physics no "atom" or smallest particle has been found which is not >> >a "process" instead of a thing. The history of the "atomic theory" has >> >led from intuitive units in the Greeks to subatomic particles >> >currently to possibly "strings". But as yet all known object including >> >particle are changing states of fields or smaller particles. Therefore >> >all known objects are just processes which are interactions of >> >changing relationships between other processes. >> >> >> >That would be the fallacy of affirming the consequent in >> >> >logic so I am trying to learn how to argue the position. >> >> >> It would help if you were to define your terms coherently. >> >> >Ha, check that out. You know for the last decade I get complaints to >> >not define and explain myself so thoroughly. I am the pasting man >> >because I will flood you with "excellently to the point jizz" >> >> >Affirming the consequent >> >> Oh hell, I know what affirming the consequent is. What I don't know is >> what you mean by "object" or "process" >> > >I meant a "physical object" which might be defined as; a tangible and >visible entity; an entity that can cast a shadow; "it was full of >rackets, balls and other objects" > >http://www.google.com/search?q=define%3Aobject > >process > >1 course of action or proceeding, esp. a series of stages in >manufacture etc. 2 progress or course (in process of construction). 3 >natural or involuntary course or change (process of growing old). 4 >action at law; summons or writ. 5 natural projection of a bone, stem, >etc. v. 1 deal with by a particular process. 2 (as processed adj.) >treat (food, esp. to prevent decay) (processed cheese). [[Latin: >related to proceed]] > >Now in formal branch of philosophy called; "process philosophy" the >definition is a little different; here is a relatively short >definition; > >Process Philosophy > >The doctrine that either what is is becoming, or that what is >ultimately consists in change, or both. A process is a sequence of >changes. > >Strong and weak process philosophy may be usefully distinguished. On >the weak version, x changes if and only if either x is F at a time, >t1, and x is not F at a later time, t2, or x is not F at t1 and x is F >at t2; so something's changing consists in its gaining or losing at >least one property. It is sometimes maintained (with dubious >coherence) that each thing is always changing in every respect. > >On the strong version, there are only changes or, at least, the >existence of enduring items logically depends upon changes such that >it is ontologically misleading to speak of what is or things that are. >One locus classicus of strong process philosophy is Plato's >Theaetetus, where the thesis is ascribed by Socrates to Protagoras, >Heraclitus, and Empedocles; another is Heraclitus' Cosmic Fragments. > >More recently, 'process philosophy' has been used as a name for the >event ontologies of James, Bergson, and Whitehead (notably, in his >Process and Reality). It should also be extended to Russell's neutral >monist doctrine that minds and physical objects are logical >constructions out of events. > >The existence of change, which is logically entailed by the existence >of process, has been denied by Parmenides in his Poem, by F. H. >Bradley in Appearance and Reality, and by J. M. E. McTaggart in The >Nature of Existence. If some of the arguments of these philosophers >are sound then there really is no change and a fortiori no true >process philosophy. However, at least prima facie, change is a >pervasive feature of what is, and many things that are may be >described without contradiction as processes. > >http://www.drury.edu/multinl/story.cfm?ID=2528&NLID=166 > > >> >> >> >> >> >Affirming the consequent is a logical fallacy in the form of a >> >hypothetical proposition. Propositionally speaking, Affirming the >> >Consequent is the logical equivalent of assuming the converse of a >> >statement to be true. The fallacy of affirming the consequent occurs >> >when a hypothetical proposition comprising an antecedent and a >> >consequent asserts that the truthhood of the consequent implies the >> >truthhood of the antecedent. This is fallacious because it assumes a >> >bidirectionality when it does not necessarily exist. >> >> >...This logical error is called the fallacy of affirming the >> >consequent because it is mistakenly concluded from the second premise >> >that the affirmation of the consequent entails the truthhood of the >> >antecedent. One way to demonstrate the invalidity is to use a >> >counterexample. Here is an argument that is obviously incorrect: >> >> >...However, be aware that a similar argument form is valid in which >> >the first premise asserts "if and only if" rather than "if". >> >Similarly, the converse of a statement can be validly assumed to be >> >true so long as the "if and only if" phrase is attached. >> >> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affirming_the_consequent >> >> >http://www.drury.edu/ess/Logic/Informal/Affirming_the_Consequent.html >> >> >> >All known objects are processes. Consciousness is as much an object as >> >> >other processes that re-present a present moment through changing >> >> >stuff, everything is constantly changing and opposite things are >> >> >identical, so that everything is and is not at the same time. In other >> >> >words, Universal Flux and the Identity of Opposites may entail a >> >> >denial of the Law of Non-Contradiction, since all things go and >> >> >nothing stays, and comparing existents to the flow of a river which >> >> >you cannot step twice into. On those stepping into rivers staying the >> >> >same other and other waters flow. There is an antithesis between >> >> >'same' and 'other,' different waters flow in rivers staying the same, >> >> >though the waters are always changing, the rivers stay the same. >> >> >Indeed, it must be precisely because the waters are always changing >> >> >that there are rivers at all, rather than lakes or ponds. The message >> >> >is that rivers can stay the same over time even though, or indeed >> >> >because, the waters change. The point, then, is not that everything is >> >> >changing, but that the fact that some things change makes possible the >> >> >continued existence of other things. Perhaps more generally, the >> >> >change in elements or constituents supports the constancy of higher- >> >> >level structures. >> >> >> Word salad. Try again. >> >> >Can you point to somewhere where your theory of word salad applies in >> >the above text. It will do no good to just claim something is true or >> >false >> >> I can't determine whether it's true or false, because it's incoherent. >> I literally have no idea what you're trying to say. >> > >Then your demanding a traditional usage of the term object and I am >not using it that way. Using your own personal definitions of words is one of the surest ways to impede communication. You might want to re-think your approach. >What might help is if you chant; "if objects >are processes then..." > >More importantly can you point to where it begins to not make sense? At "if objects are processes then...". |