Free will
in [Lisp]
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From: Raffael Cavallaro on 20 May 2010 10:37 On 2010-05-20 00:46:33 -0400, Don Geddis said: > We actually do have free choice. It doesn't require dualism, and it's > even compatible with determinism. Yours is the compatibilist position, which I think is logically void (I.e., I am an incompatibilist): <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism_and_incompatibilism> If this is indeed the source of our disagreement, there's little point in further discussion, as our positions are fundamentally irreconcilable. warmest regards, Ralph -- Raffael Cavallaro
From: Pascal Costanza on 20 May 2010 10:43 On 20/05/2010 14:53, RG wrote: > In article<85kog0Fi69U1(a)mid.individual.net>, > Pascal Costanza<pc(a)p-cos.net> wrote: > >> On 20/05/2010 14:13, RG wrote: >>> In article<85kmdsF5dhU1(a)mid.individual.net>, >>> Pascal Costanza<pc(a)p-cos.net> wrote: >>> >>>> On 20/05/2010 13:22, RG wrote: >>>>> In article<85k743Fal6U1(a)mid.individual.net>, >>>>> Pascal Costanza<pc(a)p-cos.net> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 20/05/2010 08:06, RG wrote: >>>>>>> In article<87wruzqj5w.fsf(a)mail.geddis.org>, >>>>>>> Don Geddis<don(a)geddis.org> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> "Free choice" is not necessarily incompatible with determinism. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That's news to me. How is that possible? >>>>>> >>>>>> Just because something is determined at one level doesn't mean it's >>>>>> determined at the higher levels as well. For example, Google's search >>>>>> algorithm is most certainly a deterministic algorithm, but that doesn't >>>>>> mean that the search results will be deterministic as well. >>>>>> >>>>>> Same with "free will": Just because the neurons in your brain act >>>>>> according to deterministic principles doesn't mean that the decisions >>>>>> you make are deterministic. >>>>>> >>>>>> Hofstadter had a good example: If you have to make the decision to >>>>>> choose between a Pizza Margherita and a Pizza Hawaii doesn't mean that >>>>>> your neurons are oscillating between Margherita-ness and Hawaii-ness. >>>>>> They just act independent of what's going on at that level decision >>>>>> making. >>>>>> >>>>>> "Free will" can be seen as an emergent property of your body functions. >>>>> >>>>> Is there really a substantive difference between "emergent property" and >>>>> "illusion"? >>>> >>>> Yes, I think so. >>>> >>>> What I find especially dangerous is that arguments that suggest that >>>> free will is just an illusion can change people's behavior, and make >>>> them more passive, less active in their actions: I strongly believe that >>>> if someone thinks they are fully determined makes them act differently >>>> than if they think they have a free will. This alone shows that that >>>> level can indeed have an influence on people's decisions, no matter >>>> where their actions are actually determined or not. >>>> >>>> In other words, the determination of the physical world on one's >>>> conscious actions are irrelevant, in my opinion. Physical determination >>>> is an illusion, and a pretty dangerous one, not free will. >>> >>> But that's not an argument that free will is real. That's an argument >>> that believing in determinism has harmful effects, and so there are >>> benefits to maintaining a collective delusion that people "really" have >>> free will (whatever that means) independent of whether or not this is >>> actually true. I don't dispute that. But it's a different argument. >>> It makes the difference between "illusions" and "emergent property" >>> rhetorical, not substantive. >> >> It does make a difference. "Illusion" means it's not real, "emergent >> property" means it's real. >> >> I don't know whether "free will" is real or not, and neither can you. > > What is it with everyone telling me what I can and can't do? Of course > I can know. Not only *can* I, I'm pretty sure I actually *do*. This is not a personal attack. With "you", I mean "everybody". I don't think you can conclude anything about the existence or non-existence of free will based on what's going on at the physical, chemical, or biological level, because that's the wrong level from which to describe a concept such as "free will". In my opinion. >> There is a model that potentially explains "free will" as an emergent >> property, plus on top of that, "free will" can have a positive effect on >> how people live their lives. That's good enough for me to accept a >> notion of "free will" as a given. Everything else is speculation. (Well, >> my position is speculative, too, but I prefer it because it has >> potentially positive effects.) > > So what you're saying is: 1) based on what you know, you can't rule out > the possibility that free will is real and 2) the belief that free will > is real has benefits so 3) you choose believe free will is real and you > don't wish to hear any arguments or evidence to the contrary. Is that a > fair restatement of your position? Your wording of 3) is a bit too harsh for my taste, but this basically sums it up, yes. The laws of nature don't care whether you voted for Obama or not, but your voting for Obama or not was nevertheless a conscious choice, and not some mechanical reaction to your brain activities. Pascal -- My website: http://p-cos.net Common Lisp Document Repository: http://cdr.eurolisp.org Closer to MOP & ContextL: http://common-lisp.net/project/closer/
From: Bob Felts on 20 May 2010 10:54 Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > On 2010-05-20 07:52:57 -0400, Nicolas Neuss said: > > > I'm somehow lost how anyone can believe as firmly > > as Raffael in determinism nowadays. > > I don't believe in hard determinism (i.e., I do accept that quantum > indeterminacy exists). However, there is no existing evidence that > quantum indeterminacy operating in the brain is equivalent to free > will. What powers the imagination? [...] > > On the contrary, we have a great deal of evidence that our subjective > evaluation of the freeness of our choices is wildly inaccurate. All you've done is map out some hardware traces; you haven't begun to figure out the software.
From: Raffael Cavallaro on 20 May 2010 11:29 On 2010-05-20 10:54:10 -0400, Bob Felts said: > What powers the imagination? Picasso, and Hemmingway agreed it was Absinthe. ;^) warmest regards, Ralph -- Raffael Cavallaro
From: RG on 20 May 2010 13:15
In article <ht3hfv$9s4$2(a)news.eternal-september.org>, Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > On 2010-05-20 09:01:48 -0400, Nick Keighley said: > > > The law is part of what constrains behaviour of > > the robots and leads to stable societies that maximise average > > reproductive success. > > I wrote "recast" our legal system, not eliminate. In particular, legal > theories of criminal penalties typically deal with several types of > penalty, among them, deterrence (as you note), incapacitation ("keeping > criminals off the street"), rehabilitation (re-training, or > re-educating criminals so they become less likely to commit future > offenses), and retribution ("punishing the morally wicked"). If we have > no free will, then any penalties based on retribution become pointless, > even cruel, like sentencing a slug to 40 lashes for wickedly eating > your garden lettuce. Retribution is not pointless. The point is to assuage the negative emotions of anger and helplessness that people feel when they are victims of a crime. This is true regardless of whether or not you believe in free will or dualism. One can certainly argue that retribution is cruel, or that the benefits are not worth the costs. But under no circumstances is it pointless. rg |