Free will
in [Lisp]
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From: Raffael Cavallaro on 18 May 2010 17:47 On 2010-05-18 16:58:09 -0400, Vend said: > >> The belief that "one has choice unconstrained >> by the laws of physics" > > This is a different statement, and it is false even under dualism, > unless you want to claim that one is omnipotent. For about the 5th time now, "choice unconstrained by the laws of physics" does not mean "freedom to choose the physically impossible," or omnipotence. It means, given a choice among a number of physically possible things, that the choice itself is extra-physical, unconstrained by physics. Again, I don't believe this, but this is precisely what the original, dualist notion of free will holds - that the will or soul is an extra-physical causal agent. warmest regards, Ralph -- Raffael Cavallaro
From: Bob Felts on 18 May 2010 20:11 Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > On 2010-05-18 16:58:09 -0400, Vend said: > > > > >> The belief that "one has choice unconstrained > >> by the laws of physics" > > > > This is a different statement, and it is false even under dualism, > > unless you want to claim that one is omnipotent. > > For about the 5th time now, "choice unconstrained by the laws of > physics" does not mean "freedom to choose the physically impossible," > or omnipotence. It means, given a choice among a number of physically > possible things, that the choice itself is extra-physical, > unconstrained by physics. Not necessarily. We may be completely subject to the rules of physics but, as in Pascal's example, the "creator" can change the software outside of the laws of physics. > Again, I don't believe this, but this is precisely what the original, > dualist notion of free will holds - that the will or soul is an > extra-physical causal agent. Is software physical? Were Russell alive today, given what he wrotein his book "The Problems of Philosophy", he might very well argue that it isn't.
From: Raffael Cavallaro on 18 May 2010 21:18 On 2010-05-18 20:11:03 -0400, Bob Felts said: > Not necessarily. We may be completely subject to the rules of physics > but, as in Pascal's example, the "creator" can change the software > outside of the laws of physics. Either way, it's extra physical causation. As a matter of historical fact, the soul or will has usually been held to be this extra-physical cause. -- Raffael Cavallaro
From: Kenneth Tilton on 19 May 2010 01:39 Raffael Cavallaro wrote: > On 2010-05-18 16:58:09 -0400, Vend said: > >> >>> The belief that "one has choice unconstrained >>> by the laws of physics" >> >> This is a different statement, and it is false even under dualism, >> unless you want to claim that one is omnipotent. > > For about the 5th time now, "choice unconstrained by the laws of > physics" does not mean "freedom to choose the physically impossible," or > omnipotence. It means, given a choice among a number of physically > possible things, that the choice itself is extra-physical, unconstrained > by physics. Again, I don't believe this, but this is precisely what the > original, dualist notion of free will holds - that the will or soul is > an extra-physical causal agent. You know how desperatelessly hopeless is your position when you find yourself defining the other side's position for them so fictionally. Not that fictionally is a word, mind you. ht,hk
From: Raffael Cavallaro on 19 May 2010 09:34
On 2010-05-19 01:39:55 -0400, Kenneth Tilton said: > You know how desperatelessly hopeless is your position when you find > yourself defining the other side's position for them so fictionally. The notion of dualism and extra-physical souls/wills/minds is an idea of long historical standing, and was certainly not defined by me. You might want to read up on this stuff before you start sniping. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind#Dualist_solutions_to_the_mind-body_problem> warmest regards, Ralph -- Raffael Cavallaro |