Free will
in [Lisp]
|
From: Nicolas Neuss on 20 May 2010 07:52 Pascal Costanza <pc(a)p-cos.net> writes: > Just because something is determined at one level doesn't mean it's > determined at the higher levels as well. And we should also keep in mind that even at the lowest level of quantum mechanics things are deterministic only in a rather questionable and non-observable sense. I'm somehow lost how anyone can believe as firmly as Raffael in determinism nowadays. I had thought this to be an attitude of the 19th century which had more-or-less died out. But apparently it has survived (in a sufficiently far distance from physics) until today. Nicolas
From: Pascal Costanza on 20 May 2010 07:57 On 20/05/2010 13:22, RG wrote: > In article<85k743Fal6U1(a)mid.individual.net>, > Pascal Costanza<pc(a)p-cos.net> wrote: > >> On 20/05/2010 08:06, RG wrote: >>> In article<87wruzqj5w.fsf(a)mail.geddis.org>, >>> Don Geddis<don(a)geddis.org> wrote: >>> >>>> "Free choice" is not necessarily incompatible with determinism. >>> >>> That's news to me. How is that possible? >> >> Just because something is determined at one level doesn't mean it's >> determined at the higher levels as well. For example, Google's search >> algorithm is most certainly a deterministic algorithm, but that doesn't >> mean that the search results will be deterministic as well. >> >> Same with "free will": Just because the neurons in your brain act >> according to deterministic principles doesn't mean that the decisions >> you make are deterministic. >> >> Hofstadter had a good example: If you have to make the decision to >> choose between a Pizza Margherita and a Pizza Hawaii doesn't mean that >> your neurons are oscillating between Margherita-ness and Hawaii-ness. >> They just act independent of what's going on at that level decision making. >> >> "Free will" can be seen as an emergent property of your body functions. > > Is there really a substantive difference between "emergent property" and > "illusion"? Yes, I think so. What I find especially dangerous is that arguments that suggest that free will is just an illusion can change people's behavior, and make them more passive, less active in their actions: I strongly believe that if someone thinks they are fully determined makes them act differently than if they think they have a free will. This alone shows that that level can indeed have an influence on people's decisions, no matter where their actions are actually determined or not. In other words, the determination of the physical world on one's conscious actions are irrelevant, in my opinion. Physical determination is an illusion, and a pretty dangerous one, not free will. Pascal -- My website: http://p-cos.net Common Lisp Document Repository: http://cdr.eurolisp.org Closer to MOP & ContextL: http://common-lisp.net/project/closer/
From: Pascal Costanza on 20 May 2010 07:58 On 20/05/2010 13:52, Nicolas Neuss wrote: > Pascal Costanza<pc(a)p-cos.net> writes: > >> Just because something is determined at one level doesn't mean it's >> determined at the higher levels as well. > > And we should also keep in mind that even at the lowest level of quantum > mechanics things are deterministic only in a rather questionable and > non-observable sense. I'm somehow lost how anyone can believe as firmly > as Raffael in determinism nowadays. I had thought this to be an > attitude of the 19th century which had more-or-less died out. But > apparently it has survived (in a sufficiently far distance from physics) > until today. Indeed. Pascal -- My website: http://p-cos.net Common Lisp Document Repository: http://cdr.eurolisp.org Closer to MOP & ContextL: http://common-lisp.net/project/closer/
From: RG on 20 May 2010 08:13 In article <85kmdsF5dhU1(a)mid.individual.net>, Pascal Costanza <pc(a)p-cos.net> wrote: > On 20/05/2010 13:22, RG wrote: > > In article<85k743Fal6U1(a)mid.individual.net>, > > Pascal Costanza<pc(a)p-cos.net> wrote: > > > >> On 20/05/2010 08:06, RG wrote: > >>> In article<87wruzqj5w.fsf(a)mail.geddis.org>, > >>> Don Geddis<don(a)geddis.org> wrote: > >>> > >>>> "Free choice" is not necessarily incompatible with determinism. > >>> > >>> That's news to me. How is that possible? > >> > >> Just because something is determined at one level doesn't mean it's > >> determined at the higher levels as well. For example, Google's search > >> algorithm is most certainly a deterministic algorithm, but that doesn't > >> mean that the search results will be deterministic as well. > >> > >> Same with "free will": Just because the neurons in your brain act > >> according to deterministic principles doesn't mean that the decisions > >> you make are deterministic. > >> > >> Hofstadter had a good example: If you have to make the decision to > >> choose between a Pizza Margherita and a Pizza Hawaii doesn't mean that > >> your neurons are oscillating between Margherita-ness and Hawaii-ness. > >> They just act independent of what's going on at that level decision making. > >> > >> "Free will" can be seen as an emergent property of your body functions. > > > > Is there really a substantive difference between "emergent property" and > > "illusion"? > > Yes, I think so. > > What I find especially dangerous is that arguments that suggest that > free will is just an illusion can change people's behavior, and make > them more passive, less active in their actions: I strongly believe that > if someone thinks they are fully determined makes them act differently > than if they think they have a free will. This alone shows that that > level can indeed have an influence on people's decisions, no matter > where their actions are actually determined or not. > > In other words, the determination of the physical world on one's > conscious actions are irrelevant, in my opinion. Physical determination > is an illusion, and a pretty dangerous one, not free will. But that's not an argument that free will is real. That's an argument that believing in determinism has harmful effects, and so there are benefits to maintaining a collective delusion that people "really" have free will (whatever that means) independent of whether or not this is actually true. I don't dispute that. But it's a different argument. It makes the difference between "illusions" and "emergent property" rhetorical, not substantive. rg
From: RG on 20 May 2010 08:15
In article <871vd6n61y.fsf(a)ma-patru.mathematik.uni-karlsruhe.de>, Nicolas Neuss <lastname(a)kit.edu> wrote: > Pascal Costanza <pc(a)p-cos.net> writes: > > > Just because something is determined at one level doesn't mean it's > > determined at the higher levels as well. > > And we should also keep in mind that even at the lowest level of quantum > mechanics things are deterministic only in a rather questionable and > non-observable sense. I'm somehow lost how anyone can believe as firmly > as Raffael in determinism nowadays. I had thought this to be an > attitude of the 19th century which had more-or-less died out. But > apparently it has survived (in a sufficiently far distance from physics) > until today. Quantum randomness does not rule out the possibility of classical determinism under the right circumstances. Computers are a pretty good example of this. rg |